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Abstract  
 
 Focusing events are sudden, rare events that become known to policymakers and the 
public simultaneously, highlighting issues with existing public policy. Two case studies, the gas 
leak from the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility near Porter Ranch, and the publication of 
the Health Risk Assessment and discovery of lead contamination from Exide Technologies’ 
battery recycling facility in Vernon, are used to deepen theoretical insights into the development 
and functionality of industrial health crises as focusing events. The case studies suggest four key 
areas relevant to understanding focusing events. The first is the unique characteristics of 
industrial health crises, which often involve anthropogenic risks and a degree of contestation 
unusual in other focusing event literature. The second is the scale of analysis, balancing 
geospatial realities with local histories, broad social dynamics and power structures, and the 
multiscalar nature of policy change. Third, community activism plays multiple vital roles in 
pushing a potential focusing event towards lasting policy change. Finally, the incorporation of 
ideas from environmental justice into the focusing event framework results in a better 
understanding of power and privilege in the creation of, and response to, industrial health crises. 
All four aspects have been written about in other bodies of literature, but have not yet been 
brought to bear on the concept of focusing events. These four domains thus add nuance to the 
scholarly understanding of one aspect of the policy change process, and provide a starting point 
for further research into the processes governing our public policy systems.  
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Introduction 
 
On October 23, 2015, the Southern California Gas Company realized something was 
wrong. One of the wells in its Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility in Los Angeles – Well 
SS-25 – had begun leaking. The exact cause was unclear, but now a mix of methane, mercaptans, 
and other chemicals was flowing out of the ground at an alarming rate and dispersing into the 
atmosphere above one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world. Soon, numerous local, state, 
and federal agencies got involved, lawyers moved in, and ten weeks later, a state of emergency 
was declared by Governor Jerry Brown. SoCalGas relocated residents and policymakers 
promised action. By February, the leak was capped, but debates over the appropriate long-term 
response, estimates of impacts on public health and greenhouse gas emissions, and Aliso 
Canyon’s role in local energy security continued.    
Just across town and only months before, in March 2015, the Exide Technologies battery 
recycling plant had finally been shuttered. Although there had been complaints, concerns, and 
fines for decades, the shutdown was put in motion by a 2013 report revealing that nearby 
residents and workers faced an increased risk of cancer from arsenic emissions from the facility. 
It took almost two years to close the facility, and as of late 2016, neighboring communities have 
not received adequate funding to test for or remediate hazardous compounds including lead and 
arsenic that the facility emitted over its long tenure.  
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This disparity was succinctly and dramatically summed up by the opening paragraphs of 
an article entitled “Exide, Porter Ranch: A Double Standard,” written by Nancy Martinez (2016) 
for a consortium of local papers in eastern Los Angeles:  
The complaints of headaches, bloody noses and asthma by Porter Ranch residents sound 
all to [sic] familiar to eastside activists who’ve spent years fighting their own large scale 
local environmental health hazard. 
So are the demands for government officials to immediately shut down Southern 
California Gas Co.’s natural gas storage facilities near Porter Ranch that residents blame 
for their health crisis. 
Strikingly different, however, has been the response from state regulators and elected 
officials – including Gov. Jerry Brown –who for years failed to take the same level of 
bold action to stop Vernon-based Exide Technologies from putting the lives of thousands 
of east and southeast working class, predominately Latino residents at risk. 
Money, race and political power are at the root of the inequity, activists claim. 
Two weeks later, the idea was picked up by the Los Angeles (LA) Times editorial staff: 
“Why does affluent Porter Ranch get more urgent environmental relief than working-class Boyle 
Heights?” (LA Times Editorial Staff, 2016a), broaching the comparison to a much wider 
audience. The LA Times headline raises two interesting points. First, these two communities have 
significantly different histories and demographics, and the very existence of, let alone response 
to, their respective industrial health crises1 is cause for interrogation. Second, the use of the term 
“relief” brings up the question of the appropriate response to a crisis. There is usually an 
immediate, emergency response, the relief, but the longer-term implications can be much more 
opaque.  
                                                          
1 There is significant scholarly discourse on the terms crisis and disaster. I follow Boin and ‘T Hart’s 
distinction (2007), also used by Birkland (1996). In a crisis, “a community of people perceives an urgent 
threat to core values or life-sustaining functions which must be dealt with under conditions of uncertainty” 
(pg. 42), i.e. a fork in the path. A disaster is an “episode that is collectively construed as very harmful” (pg. 
42); i.e. the worse outcome occurred. In industrial and environmental health threats, negative impacts are 
often avoidable if action is taken promptly and wisely. Thus, in this work, I use the term “crisis” for the 
onset of the two events, and disaster to refer to the outcomes when relevant. 
Chittick • 3 
 
In his seminal work on the policymaking process, John Kingdon refers to such crises as 
focusing events that draw policymakers’ attention to a policy failure which is then promoted on 
the policy agenda for review and, ideally, change (Kingdon, 1995). Subsequent work on focusing 
events has analyzed events that can be quantified by levels of death and destruction, such as 
hurricanes and earthquakes, terrorist attacks, nuclear accidents, and oil spills (Birkland, 1997, 
2006; Bishop, 2014), and demonstrates via case studies that such focusing events can raise 
relevant issues on the governmental agenda, if not necessarily result in concrete changes in 
policy.  However, the two case studies at hand raise a number of questions about industrial health 
crises as focusing events, and I argue that they illustrate four key omissions in the current model. 
These four factors – the uniqueness of industrial crises, the scale of issue and response, the role 
of community organizing, and a lack of focus on justice – influence the role industrial health 
crises play in policy change, and are a lesson in policy change after disasters of the industrial era.  
The first factor is the uniqueness of industrial health crises, compared to other crises such 
as hurricanes and earthquakes.2 This can be roughly divided into the complicated, anthropogenic 
nature of the risk, and the inherent contestation over causes, impacts, and appropriate responses 
that arise from such crises. For example, the risk might arise from extended, invisible emissions 
and might manifest as increased rates of cancer rather than immediate losses of life, with some 
notable exceptions such as Bhopal. Although in certain respects a comparison with nuclear 
power is relevant – both occur due to a technological or human failure, rather than an “act of 
God,” and the hazard is typically invisible to the naked eye yet can have dramatic long-term 
impacts – there are other differences that influence such crises’ role as focusing events.  
                                                          
2 Birkland also discusses oil spills at length. However, in the vast majority of cases, these have no direct 
impact on human health but rather pose significant ecological and economic risks.  
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Second is the scale of response. The existing literature primarily focuses on federal policy 
and long-term policy change (Birkland, 1997; Sabatier, 1988; Smith, 2000), although many case 
studies skate around similar ideas using alternative framings (Pulido et al., 2016; Rich et al., 
1995; Zavestoski et al., 2002). While federal policy is undoubtedly influential in environmental 
regulation and thus pollution risks, industrial health crises are nearly always local, and the scale 
of the response is commensurate. Activist groups responding to a health hazard from an 
industrial facility have the greatest leverage at the city or county level, particularly in a highly 
populous state like California, due simply to the crush of people and problems competing for 
attention. In this respect, the city of Los Angeles is a particularly good location to study, as its 
sheer size gives municipal and county structures and its heft at the state and federal levels much 
more weight than other areas of the US.  
A third oversight in the policy process literature is the integral role of community 
organizing. Although prior research includes the public as a figure in policy decisions, it de-
emphasizes the role of active protest and engagement in publicizing an issue, holding 
policymakers accountable, and making demands. Through organizing, affected communities are 
able to keep their health crises on the policy agenda and to set alternatives for policy change. 
Without the dedication and work of affected residents, many potential focusing events would 
fade away into the sea of other issues that bureaucrats and elected officials face.  
The final factor is a lack of focus on justice: the influence of focusing events is dependent 
on which communities are affected and the resources they can leverage to push for change. 
Industrial health crises usually have highly localized impacts, affecting single communities, 
often low-income communities of color (Lerner, 2010). These communities are often the least 
able to take advantage of the opportunity for change presented by a potential focusing event. 
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Political, social, and economic marginalization affects their ability to act as a concerned public or 
gain sustained attention from political actors and the larger media. Although this is not an 
absolute truth for all industrial health crises, it is a substantial pattern ((Morello-Frosch & Lopez, 
2006); Lerner, 2010).  The two case studies in question provide a powerful illustration of some 
of these concepts, as one, Exide, occurred in just such a community, while the other, Aliso 
Canyon, occurred in much wealthier, whiter neighborhood. These facts do not change the 
suffering of either community, but rather provide a basis for analyzing the impact of these 
characteristics on policy responses within the same city.  
I use the Aliso Canyon natural gas leak and the Exide Technologies lead contamination 
as case studies to explore these facets of industrial crises. Each of the four influences the ability 
of industrial health crises to act as focusing events, and therefore can deepen our understanding 
of the nature of focusing events and their role in public policy processes. The policies relevant to 
industrial health events are located in three broad policy domains: environmental regulation, 
public health, and their intersection, environmental justice (EJ). In this thesis, I will outline a 
brief history of the EJ movement and its influence on public policy and academic discourse and 
its lessons for policy analysis, with a particular focus on Southern California. Subsequently I will 
explore the literature on policy change and current air pollution policy in the Los Angeles area, a 
multilayered network of rules, agencies, and overlapping jurisdictions. In chapters 3 and 4, I 
explore the two case studies in more detail, drawing on literature about environmental justice, 
vulnerability, and crisis to understand the intertwined histories of these communities and their 
respective crises. In the final chapter, I pull together important aspects of the two case studies to 
explain these four factors in more depth and argue for their incorporation in the model of policy 
responses to focusing events.  
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The bulk of the research for this thesis draws on media reports, government documents 
and publications, and content provided by the companies themselves. Data were all freely and 
publicly available, with the exception of some news outlets (e.g. the Los Angeles Times) which 
require a subscription. As part of the purpose of this investigation is to determine the 
transparency and accessibility of information for affected communities, sources that do not fit 
this description, or that are only available via public records requests or pose other significant 
barriers to access were largely excluded. In addition, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
key players in the policymaking process, who consented to speak with me within their 
professional capacity. There were no foreseeable harms for respondents, and all consented to 
have their names and commentary included in this research. Commentary given in public 
forums, whether included in newspaper articles, meeting minutes, or observed by the author, 
were also included.  
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Chapter 1.  
A Brief History of Environmental Justice 
 
 Environmental justice (EJ) is the concept that all people have the right to clean 
environment in which to live, work, play, study, and worship, first suggested in 1990 by Robert 
Bullard in his seminal study of environmental injustice, Dumping in Dixie (Bullard, 1990). This 
definition has subsequently been adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
codified into American public policy. However, its roots were not in academia but rather in 
community organizing against unfair land use and toxics disposal.  
 
National environmental justice movement  
Although local organizing efforts against environmental injustices had occurred in other 
parts of the country, a watershed moment for the national EJ movement occurred in Warren 
County, North Carolina, in 1982. Illegal dumping along state highways had contaminated over 
32,000 cubic yards of soil with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a highly toxic family of 
chemicals classified as probable carcinogens (WHO, 2003). The governor decided to dispose of 
the contaminated soil in the city of Alton, Warren County. Warren County was 64% Black and 
had a median income a third lower than the state average (Bullard, 2000).  
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Despite three years of legal battles, in September, 1982, the toxic soil dumping in a 
landfill in Alton began. Local residents and civil rights activists mobilized to disrupt dump truck 
deliveries, with in hundreds of arrests. They formed Warren County Citizens Concerned About 
PCBs, which garnered national news coverage. Their work gained support from environmental 
activists, civil rights and labor leaders, and black elected officials across the country, continuing 
for years as residents struggled to mitigate serious risks to local drinking water and their health 
and to hold the state and federal EPA accountable (McGurty, 2007).  The mass organizing and 
high profile of Warren County galvanized national political will, spurring a 1983 report from the 
federal General Accounting Office on hazardous waste siting in the region. Unsurprisingly, it 
found strong correlations between race, socioeconomic status, and hazardous waste siting. In the 
following decades, extensive documentation of a similar national pattern, and actions against it at 
multiple scales by multiple stakeholders, continued to accrue (see a few examples in Table 1.1).   
Table 1.1. Selected national EJ milestones. Adapted from Bullard et al. (2014). 
Year Event 
1969 Cesar Chavez and United Farm Workers declare National Grape Boycott Day, and Ralph 
Abascal with CA Rural Legal Assistance files a suit ultimately resulting in a ban on DDT 
1978 The Love Canal toxic contamination case in Niagara Falls, NY, breaks into national news 
1979 Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management: First lawsuit charging environmental racism 
under Civil Rights Act, Houston, Texas.  
1982 Warren County, North Carolina selected as site of PCB dump, sparking intense protests  
1983 Federal General Accounting Office publishes report, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills 
and Their Correlation With Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities  
1987 United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice publishes Toxic Wastes and 
Race in the United States 
1990 Bryant and Mohai organize conference, Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards 
at the University of Michigan; Bullard publishes Dumping in Dixie.  
1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, resulting in the 
Seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice 
1992 President George HW Bush establishes the Federal Office on Environmental Equity in the 
EPA (now known as the Office of Environmental Justice) 
1994 President Clinton issues Executive Order on EJ (12898) 
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This grassroots organizing was accompanied by a surge of scholarship on EJ as a 
theoretical frame that unites justice scholarship, social theory, and spatial histories (Bullard, 
2000). Reflexive development of environmental justice concepts is ongoing, as such concepts are 
created simultaneously from the bottom-up and from the top down (Čapek, 1993). An analytical 
EJ framework assumes a specific environmental “bad,” for example a hazardous waste dump,3 is 
the result of local history and context and multiscalar social systems such as institutionalized 
racism and white privilege and educational and socioeconomic disparities between different 
groups (Brulle & Pellow, 2006; Pulido, 2000). For example, in many communities, residential 
redlining created segregated neighborhoods, and the inaccessibility of mortgages curtailed the 
ability of families of color and low-income families to build wealth through home ownership 
(Brulle & Pellow, 2006). These wider social patterns are localized to specific areas, and the 
unique characteristics and vulnerabilities of the community affect, and are affected by, the 
development of a particular “bad” or risk. Thus, understanding the specific and broader history 
of a community is crucial to understanding the advent of a particular environmental inequality.  
There is debate about cause and effect of environmental injustice, as the construction of a 
potentially hazardous facility can depress housing prices, encouraging move-in of low-income 
residents, often of color, but recent research indicates that the pattern of inequality is more 
strongly influenced by unequal siting rather than by minority move-in (Pastor et al., 2001). 
Regardless of cause and effect, the outcome illustrates the complex interplay of historical and 
social factors in the creation of environmental injustice. At a more fundamental level, the idea 
that siting and intentionality define environmental racism is rooted in a narrow conception of 
what constitutes environmental racism (Pulido, 2000).  
                                                          
3 This has also been extended to specific environmental “goods” like access to safe green spaces and work 
spaces. Here I focus on “bads” because the case studies are pollution and public health cases.  
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In EJ research, the role of race has become particularly important; even when controlled 
for income and other factors, people of color are disproportionately impacted by environmental 
hazards (Pastor et al., 2001). While other aspects of identity including socioeconomic status, 
gender, ability, and age play a significant role in the unequal distribution of environmental 
benefits and hazards, the role of race and socioeconomic status will be the focus here, explored 
in the context of Los Angeles in the following section.   
Environmental justice in California and Los Angeles  
Both scholars and activists have penned key works on environmental justice rooted in 
Southern California and the Los Angeles area in particular. As a city, Los Angeles has macro-
level diversity, with high numbers of Latinx and Asian residents compared to the wider US, 
coupled with widespread residential segregation (Silver, 2015). It also has significant income 
inequality, with both a higher median income and a higher percent of people in poverty than the 
US as a whole, coupled with a long and extensive history of industrial production. For more 
demographic details, see Table 1.2. These factors intersect to create situations of environmental 
injustice across the city and region (Morello-Frosch & Lopez, 2006; Pulido, 2000). 
Table 1.2. Demographics of Los Angeles County. US Census Bureau, 2010.  
 Los Angeles County United States 
Total population 9,818,700 308,758,100 
White alone, not Hispanic (%) 27.8 63.7 
Black alone (%) 8.7 12.6 
Asian alone (%) 15.0 4.8 
American Indian and Alaska Native alone (%) 0.7 0.9 
Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander (%) 0.3 0.2 
Hispanic/Latinx (%) 47.7 16.3 
Two or more races (%) 3.0 0.2 
Foreign-born (%) 34.9 13.1 
Non-English language spoken at home  
       (% of people above 5 years) 
56.8 20.9 
Median income ($) 55,870 53,482 
Persons in poverty (%) 18.7 13.5 
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Case studies in LA have amply documented disproportionate exposure to various toxic 
facilities and sources of pollution between white communities and low-income communities of 
color (Boer, Pastor, Sadd, & Snyder, 1997; Pastor, Sadd, & Hipp, 2001; Sadd, Pastor, Boer, & 
Snyder, 1999). In her seminal piece on white privilege and environmental justice, Laura Pulido 
(2000) uses Los Angeles to argue that geographic studies of environmental racism must move 
beyond purely spatial analyses to incorporate more nuanced historical understandings of racism 
and white privilege in the context of spatial relations. She notes that in Los Angeles, as in many 
other cities, white residents “secured relatively cleaner environments by moving away from older 
industrial cores via suburbanization;” thus the “historical processes of suburbanization and 
decentralization…have contributed to contemporary patterns of environmental racism” (p. 12). It 
is within this particular context, and these larger frameworks, that our two case studies are 
situated. Pulido’s framework in particular is crucial to understand the histories laid out in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
Incorporation of environmental justice into law and public policy  
 The EJ movement has had an effect beyond mitigating local EJ issues: it has successfully 
codified many of its tenets into federal and state laws. Two landmark moments came in the 
1990s. The first was President George HW Bush’s 1992 creation of the Federal Office on 
Environmental Equity (now known as the Office of Environmental Justice) in the EPA. The OEJ 
oversees the National EJ Advisory Council, the Federal Interagency Working Group on EJ, and 
EJ Small Grants. The second was President Clinton’s 1994 Executive Order 12898, “Federal 
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations,” which requires all federal agencies to consider environmental justice in decision-
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making. Other federal agencies have incorporated these ideas into their work, including Housing 
and Urban Development in initiatives for lead abatement and brownfield redevelopment, and the 
Department of Transportation in its highway guidelines (McGurty, 2007). 
 The state of California has also demonstrated itself to be a relatively progressive. Two 
early attempts came from State Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard, who was raised in Boyle 
Heights and the daughter of the first nonwhite LA City Councilperson, Edward Roybal. She 
twice introduced a bill that would have required demographic information for any “potentially 
high-impact development projects” including hazardous and solid waste sites, although it was 
twice defeated in 1992 and 1994. Nonetheless, by 1999 California had succeeded in passing two 
related EJ laws. The first, SB 115, made the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research the 
coordinating agency for environmental justice initiatives and “called on state agencies to address 
environmental health disparities within their government programs” (Petersen et al., 2006, p. 
348). The second, SB 89, in the vein of President Bush’s national EPA, required the California 
EPA (Cal/EPA) to create a Working Group on Environmental Justice and an Environmental 
Justice Advisory Council.  
Part of the reason for this leadership in environmental justice is the changes in local and 
state leadership in California. Petersen et al. (2006) write, “the ascendancy of minority, mostly 
Latino, California legislators, many of whom had personal experience with affected communities 
and were committed to promoting environmental justice, … [provided] additional policy 
opportunities and support” (p. 349) As government institutions become more representative, they 
also better represent the experiences, values, and desires of their constituents, including 
perspectives on environmental justice. As we shall see, the role of local representatives (or lack 
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thereof, in particular in unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County) is hugely important, 
particularly in the case of Exide Technologies.  
That is not to say that public policy and political representation are complete solutions for 
environmental injustice. As Pulido, Kohl, and Cotton (Pulido et al., 2016) argue, the many small 
steps towards a more inclusive, accountable policy arena that I outlined above have not, in 
general, led to a better environment for disadvantaged communities. In some cases EJ activism 
has stopped the development of new facilities or the expansion of existing ones, but macroscopic 
improvements have not come about through policy change. Nonetheless, public policy remains 
an important tool for advancing justice through the remediation of existing harms such as Exide 
and Aliso, and the prevention of new ones. The general processes of policy change within 
Southern California, and how crises such as Aliso and Exide fit into them, will be explored in 
more depth in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Two  
Changing Public Policy: Theoretical Frames and Toxic Emissions 
Management in the LA Basin 
 
The process of policy change is never easy. It often takes years, even decades, for the 
right confluence of people, events, and resources to push through a substantive reform. 
According to political scientist and public policy scholar John Kingdon, such change happens in 
roughly four stages: setting the policy agenda, specification of alternatives, a decision among 
these alternatives (e.g. an Executive Order or passage of a law), and finally implementation 
(1995). Although these four stages are somewhat discrete, the actual occurrence of policy change 
does not happen in neat, stepwise progression.  
Rather, such processes are best described by Kingdon’s adaptation of Cohen, March, and 
Olsen’s (1972) “garbage can” model of organizational choice to policy change. Cohen et al. 
argue that choice opportunities are like garbage cans “into which various kinds of problems and 
solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated” (p. 2). A number of factors influence 
the system, including what kind of garbage goes into the can, what the can itself is like, how 
others perceive of the garbage, et cetera. 
In his adaptation of the garbage can model, Kingdon (1995) describes three streams – 
problems, policies, and politics – which must coincide to open a window for policy change (see 
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Figure 2.1). The politics stream involves the political “mood” and individual people that 
influence broader policy systems and operate independently of particular issues. The policies 
stream involves developing policy options and alternatives that can be used to solve problems. 
This is not always in response to a problem; rather, bureaucrats, academics, think tanks, and 
other policy generators develop pet ideas which they support and “hook on” to issues as they 
arise, regardless of whether they were intended to address that particular issue or not. Finally, the 
problem stream involves identifying and drawing attention to an issue, policy gap, or policy 
failure that can be addressed via a change in policy. Although this step may seem the most 
straightforward, in fact there is significant literature on the vagaries of problem definition.  
 
Figure 2.1. Kingdon’s garbage can model of policy change.  
 
Problem definition  
Hazards are produced by business operations, to be sure, but they are defined and evaluated 
socially— in the mass media, in the experts’ debate, in the jungle of interpretations and 
jurisdictions, in courts or with strategic intellectual dodges, in a milieu and in contexts...  
Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1992a) 
Also quoted in Contested Illnesses, by Brown et al. (2012, p. 1) 
 Social scientists have long rejected the idea that “social problems are objective and 
identifiable societal conditions that have intrinsically harmful effects” (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988, 
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p. 53). Rather, they are socially defined and often passionately contested. According to 
Hilgartner and Bosk, their identification and definition depend on six main elements, a few of 
which are particularly relevant to the idea of industrial health crises (1988).  
The first is competition between problems for limited societal attention. This may be 
between different views of the same issue (e.g. there is objective data indicating emissions of a 
chemical, but two groups disagree on whether it is dangerous or not) or between different issues 
(e.g. toxic chemicals versus greenhouse gas emissions). In many cases, the public and public 
agencies simply lack the resources to address all possible environmental health risks. At the local 
level, fewer total resources are available, but there is less competition for them.  
A second is that each stakeholder in the policy community has their own carrying 
capacity. For example, public agencies are often short-staffed and underfunded, and cannot 
inspect or adequately monitor all of the facilities which they are charged with regulating. 
Therefore, they are often forced to prioritize issues and set aside other potential but less pressing 
problems. In contrast, local communities may only be dealing with one facility, but may lack the 
time, money, political power, language or technical knowledge to recognize, advertise, or protest 
a problem, and even more so, a potential larger set of problems emanating from multiple sites.  
Third, while attempting to draw attention to a particular issue to establish it as a wider 
societal problem, institutional, political, and cultural factors are important. Some of these factors 
are determined by the institutional ecology4 of different problem and policy arenas, including 
priority and funding structures, and other connections between private and public organizations 
and the communities to which they are tied. Another component is the specific characteristics of 
                                                          
4 Institutional ecology is a term that attempts to acknowledge institutions as a network through which objects and 
concepts flow, encompassing the entirety of the institution, the ways in which institutions choose and respond to 
their environments, and the multiple viewpoints from which an institution can be considered (Star & Griesemer, 
1989).  
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a situation that can help or hinder its perception as a problem, including its “drama” or shock 
factor, its novelty, and its adherence to cultural preoccupations and political biases. For example, 
the same facility or pollution in two different neighborhoods may be perceived very differently: 
The Cerrell report (Powell, 1984), which infamously pointed out the qualities of communities 
that made them easier targets as hosts for locally unwanted land uses (LULUs), noted that older, 
working-class, more conservative and more Catholic neighborhoods were less likely to protest a 
new facility. Although the  report has been taken as potent evidence of the use of demographic 
data as the primary criterion for hazardous facility siting (Gibbs, 2002), it also illustrates the 
differences in community responses to an industrial facility.   
Perhaps most important in the definition of a problem is access to information. The two 
cases in question, and industrial health crises in general, also call to attention Ulrich Beck’s 
(1992b) comments on knowledge-related vulnerability. In Risk Society, Beck outlines his 
seminal theory that modernity defines and is defined by a host of new “manufactured” risks – 
pollution, new illnesses, new crimes, nuclear weapons – that are primarily controlled by human 
agency, rather than forces of nature. He writes:  
First, such physical risks are always created and effected in social systems, for example 
by organizations and institutions which are supposed to manage and control the risky 
activity. Second, the magnitude of the physical risks is therefore a direct function of the 
quality of social relations and processes. Third, the primary risk, even for the most 
technically intensive activities (indeed perhaps most especially for them), is therefore 
that of social dependency upon institutions and actors who may well be – and arguably 
are increasingly – alien, obscure and inaccessible to most people affected by the risks in 
question (p. 4).  
So-called gatekeeping of private and public documents is the process by which people, 
institutions, and processes restrict the general public’s ability to identify, demonstrate, and 
support claims of a problem or environmental injustice. Often pollution is not overtly detectable, 
making it difficult for communities to know when a potentially harmful compound like lead or 
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arsenic is being emitted. In some cases, smells, particulates, or physical symptoms act as cues to 
the risks, and in rare cases, agencies or companies publish reports that a determined member of 
the public or press can find. Particularly when it comes to technical issues such as identifying 
chemicals and assessing the associated risks, communities are at a disadvantage for 
understanding the issues they are facing, even if there is information available. This is 
compounded in communities with lower educational attainment. Finally, once a problem is 
identified and documented, selectivity of media coverage can considerably affect perception of 
the wider public and energy for collective action. Not just accessing information but sharing it is 
an unequal process, and thus what is seen a problem is always relative to who it affects and how 
much power they hold.  
These characteristics of problem definition will be explored in the context of each case 
study, but it is within this frame of contested knowledge and unequal power relations that the 
role of potential focusing events in the policy process must be understood. Indeed, there are two 
main types of crises: consensus and dissensus crises (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). In consensus 
crises, there is general agreement on the existence of a crisis and general directions for the 
response. Huge, weather-related events often fall into this category. In dissensus crises, there is 
dispute over whether the crisis actually exists, and if so, what exactly and how significant it is. 
Industrial health crises often fall into this latter category, for the informational reasons outlined 
above, as well as for the inherently difficult nature of applied population epidemiology. 
Professional epidemiologists often disagree with “popular epidemiology” that identifies an 
environmental disease based on experience and shared narrative (Brown, 1992; Brown et al., 
2012), and if there is no formalized evidence of health impacts, then there is often little action 
Chittick • 19 
 
and no liability. The contestation over the very existence of an industrial health problem is key to 
understanding its power as a focusing event.  
Kingdon originally introduced the concept of focusing events in 1994, and it has been 
further defined by Birkland as an event which is a “rare, harmful, sudden event that becomes 
known to the mass public and policy elites virtually simultaneously” (1997, p. 2). Birkland gives 
examples including natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes, terrorist attacks, oil 
spills, and nuclear accidents, all best characterized as consensus crises, but anything that meets 
the criteria is a potential focusing events. The potential focusing event is important – not all 
result in substantive reform, and the questions of which events do or do not catalyze change and 
in what ways is a primary focus of this thesis.   
 
Agenda setting  
After a problem is collectively identified, policy entrepreneurs – anyone willing to invest 
their resources, whether they are formally part of the government or not – must be convinced of 
its status and push for its inclusion on the governmental agenda (Kingdon, 1995). Kingdon 
suggests that focusing events alone are often not enough to guarantee inclusion, unless coupled 
with a preexisting perception of a problem, a combination with other similar events, or changes 
in additional indicators like housing prices. While Kingdon notes that constituent feedback is an 
important general mechanism for agenda inclusion, neither he nor Birkland explore in depth the 
role that community activism plays in the wake of focusing events. I will argue that community 
activism is not only a fourth co-factor that strengthens focusing events, but that it goes one step 
further, to introduce policy alternatives and push policy makers to take action, especially in 
localized industrial health crises.  
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Birkland (1997) notes three key factors that influence the success of focusing events in 
changing the policy agenda. The first is the degree of organization of a policy community. He 
writes, “event-driven policy [e.g. immediate disaster relief] is not the same as policy making in 
which events are used to advance group positions on how to improve existing policy [i.e. using 
an earthquake to push for stricter building codes]” (p. 37). Better organized groups are better 
able to take advantage of the leverage from a focusing event to push for the substantive changes 
they desire.  
But communities also organize in response to focusing events. The second factor 
Kingdon discusses relates to this idea: the extent of public participation. There is usually already 
a policy community in place, often some variation of the iron triangle in which agency 
bureaucrats, special interest groups, and congressional committees form the three corners of a 
triangle of strong reciprocal relationships that can inhibit positive policy change and/or outsider 
involvement (Kingdon, 1995). Focusing events open the triangle, as all three corners are 
subjected to increased public scrutiny and new interest groups enter the scene.  
The final factor is the extent to which the issue at hand is a tangible, obvious harm. When 
residents have overt symptoms or can smell the pollutant, it is easier to compel a response, if 
only because most people who visit the location can immediately detect the problem and 
sympathize with the victims. Images of damage and destruction can become powerful symbols to 
unite support for change (Birkland, 1997); think of the classic images that arose in the wake of 
September 11 or Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. The acquisition of an infrared camera that could 
detect the methane plume from the Aliso Canyon leak provided a powerful visual of the problem. 
In southeast LA, near Vernon, smells abound, but they are not from Exide, and despite a few 
individual events such as falling ash in 2007, for the most part the lead and arsenic attributed to 
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Exide were invisible and ignored (see Chapter 3). The better an issue can be visualized by the 
masses as harmful, the more likely policymakers are to care.  
 
Successful policy change 
For an issue that has successfully gotten onto the agenda, the ultimate question is whether 
reformers will be able to take advantage of that policy window to push through policy changes. 
Bennett and Howlett (1992) synthesized the existing research on policy learning and resulting 
change (see Figure 2.2). They argue that there are three types of learning: governmental, lesson-
drawing, and social. In governmental learning, state officials analyze the small scale of actions, 
rules, and processes that support a policy and make organizational changes to improve the 
efficiency or effectiveness of an existing policy. In lesson-drawing, agencies may copy, adapt, or 
draw inspiration for new ways to implement a policy objective from their policy network, 
resulting in changes in the instruments used to fulfill underlying purposes. Finally, in social 
learning, new ideas or perspectives are shared, and fundamental paradigms of a policy or policy 
domain shift to reflect new values (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). All of these processes – problem 
definition, agenda setting, policy change – will come into play in the case studies, but before 
exploring them in greater depth, it is necessary to get a better idea of the existing laws and policy 
framework regarding air pollution and toxic emissions.  
 
Figure 2.2. Typology of policy learning and change, from Bennett & Howlett (1992).  
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Air pollution policy in Southern California     
The environmental policy landscape in California is complex. The very basis of 
environmental regulation – balancing public health, technical limitations, economic priorities, 
and legal concerns – requires the input of many stakeholders and tremendous finesse. 
California’s complicated system is born out of a long and progressive history, and has achieved 
great successes in the past, including curbing the infamous LA smog. Nonetheless, it remains a 
tangled and sometimes confusing web of agencies, regulations, funding and enforcement 
challenges, public and private interests, and politics. In particular, this is influenced by a 
historical pattern of issue-specific institutions (such as the Air Resources Board) as well as a 
strong tradition of local power (CalEPA, 2001). In this section, I focus on the regulations 
regarding stationary sources of pollution, which is the domain of both case studies, drawing on 
public timelines from the California Air Resources Board (CARB, 2016b) and South Coast Air 
Quality Management District (SCAQMD, 1997).  
The 1940s saw the advent of the smog epidemic in the City of Los Angeles, an event that 
shocked the nation and catalyzed the slow formation of a number of laws and agencies to 
improve air quality in California. The 1947 Air Pollution Control Act created local Air Pollution 
Control Districts. In 1976, the districts in most of Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Los 
Angeles Counties were merged to form the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
(SCAQMD), a key agency responsible for the regulation of stationary air pollution sources such 
as manufacturing facilities and power plants.  
As early as 1959, California paved the way for air quality regulation when it enacted 
legislation requiring the California Department of Public Health to “establish air quality 
standards and necessary controls for motor vehicle emissions” (CARB, 2016b). It established 
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rules for total suspended particulates, photochemical oxidants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, 
and carbon monoxide. In 1968, California created its first Air Resources Board, CARB, which 
took over rule-making from the Department of Public Health. There were still no comprehensive 
national standards.  
Two years later, the federal EPA (EPA) was created, NEPA5 was passed, and an 
amendment to the existing Air Pollution Control Act (1955) created the Federal Clean Air Act 
(FCAA of 1970) and expanded the federal mandate to include emissions limitations on stationary 
and mobile sources. Given California’s unique air quality issues and its existing, exemplary 
system, the state was exempted from some FCAA requirements. The law even allowed other 
states to follow California’s regulations rather than those of the federal EPA.  
In 1980, the California Clean Air Act (CCAA) was passed (amended in 1988), 
establishing a twenty-year framework for air quality management in California. It served as the 
basis for much of what Congress enacted in the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 
which included rules on acid rain, ozone depletion, and toxic air pollution. Currently, the FCAA 
requires the federal EPA to (McCarthy et al., 2011): 
1. Set health-based standards for ambient air quality (National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards, or NAAQS) for “criteria pollutants.”  
a. Criteria pollutants include: ground-level ozone, particulate matter, carbon 
monoxide, lead, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide. 
b. State and local governments have attainment goals and deadlines, which can 
be met and maintained via their own regulations and permitting process, 
outlined in the State Implementation Plan (SIP).  
c. Nonattainment incurs penalties such as restrictions on federal funding.  
2. Establish national emission standards for large sources of air pollution, such as:  
                                                          
5 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires any project, agency, or other entity working 
for the federal government to complete an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and provide for public 
input to EIR and the decision-making process.  
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a. motor vehicles 
b. power plants and some industrial sources, which are subject to New Source 
Performance Standards (NSPS) with best adequately demonstrated control 
technology 
3. Mandate emission controls for sources of 187 hazardous air pollutants (HAPs), 
including benzene, arsenic, and 1,3-butadiene.  
a. Control levels dictated by MACT (Maximum Achievable Control 
Technology), updated periodically by the EPA 
b. Stationary area sources with high emissions of 30 specific  have “generally 
available” control technology rules, which are less stringent than MACT 
c. Facilities handling these air toxics are required to produce risk management 
plans and the prevention of crises is handled by the Chemical Safety and 
Hazards Investigation Board 
This list only contains the provisions of the FCAA that are relevant to the cases at hand. 
California’s unique status resides in the first part of the law, as it is allowed to set its own air 
quality goals (California Ambient Air Quality Standards, CAAQS), which are in some cases 
more stringent than federal NAAQS, and which cover additional pollutants not regulated by 
NAAQS.  
In general, state and local agencies take the frontlines on implementation and 
enforcement, and the federal government acts as a backstop in cases where additional 
enforcement power or funding is needed. CARB sets mobile source (motor vehicle) standards, 
compiles the statewide SIP, and oversees local districts. SCAQMD compiles the portion of the 
SIP for their district and controls stationary sources such as power plants and manufacturing 
facilities. Additionally, in California, facilities releasing hazardous pollutants are also required to 
conduct Health Risk Assessments (HRAs) describing the health impacts to nearby communities 
with a notification requirement if the risks exceed certain standards (Air Toxic Hot Spots Act, 
AB 2588, 1987). HRAs are overseen by SCAQMD. It was Exide’s 2013 HRA report that 
sparked the crisis over its facility in Vernon. 
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California has continued to pursue improved air quality. In 2001, CARB adopted 
Environmental Justice Policies to ensure that low-income and minority communities are equally 
considered under ARB regulations and programs. The state also piloted programs like 
Community Health Air Pollution Information System (CHAPIS, 2004), a free internet map of 
various air pollution sources in CA, including an itemized list of each source’s emissions. In 
2006, the state passed the landmark AB 32, the California Global Warming Solutions Act, which 
established a unique state-level cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases (GHGs). CARB was 
put in charge of monitoring and reducing GHG emissions such as methane, carbon dioxide, and 
nitrous oxides. CARB’s jurisdiction over GHGs is part of the reason they were heavily involved 
in the Aliso Canyon leak, despite its status as a stationary source.  
In 2012, the related SB 535 was passed, which required that at least a quarter of the cap-
and-trade auction proceeds must go to projects that benefit disadvantaged communities, and at 
least a tenth of the projects must be located in these communities. The Office of Environmental 
Health Hazards Assessment (OEHHA) identifies “disadvantaged” communities through 
CalEnviroScreen,6 a tool that identifies census tracts that are disproportionately vulnerable to and 
burdened by multiple sources of pollution. Projects range considerably in scope and content, 
from improving transportation infrastructure or building public-transit friendly affordable 
housing, and are selected by local agencies. Thus far, cap and trade proceeds have not met 
expectations, so the impact has been curtailed. 
  
                                                          
6 The first version (CalEnviroScreen 1.0) was released in 2013, and the draft third edition 
(CalEnviroScreen 3.0) is public as of November 2016: http://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/general-
info/calenviroscreen-30-draft-indicator-and-results-maps  
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Table 2.1. Selected federal and state air regulation milestones 
Year Event 
1945 City of Los Angeles establishes Bureau of Smoke Control  
1955 The federal Air Pollution Control Act is passed, funding research into air pollution. 
1959 California enacts legislation requiring the California Department of Public Health to 
“establish air quality standards and necessary controls for motor vehicle emissions” 
(CARB, n.d.). Rules are established for total suspended particulates, photochemical 
oxidants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and carbon monoxide.  
1963 The first Federal Clean Air Act (FCAA) is passed, authorizing research into air quality 
monitoring and control techniques, but not establishing national rules for air quality 
1968 California creates its first Air Resources Board (CARB), which took over rule-making from 
the Department of Public Health.  
1970  The federal EPA is created. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is passed. An 
amendment to the FCCA expands the federal mandate to include emissions control for 
stationary and mobile sources 
1976 The districts in most of Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Los Angeles Counties 
merge to form the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD).  
1980 California passes the CA Clean Air Act (CCAA), amended in 1988, which establishes a 
twenty-year framework for air quality management within the state. This is the basis for the 
FCAA amendments of 1990  
1990  Another round of amendments to the FCAA tackle acid rain, ozone depletion, and toxic air 
pollution, establish a national permitting program for stationary pollution sources, and 
increase enforcement authority. 
2001 CARB adopts EJ policies to ensure equal consideration under ARB regulations, programs. 
2006 AB 32, the California Global Warming Solutions Act, establishes state-level cap-and-trade 
for greenhouse gases.  
2012 SB 535 requires certain proportions of cap-and-trade proceeds go to projects benefitting 
environmentally disadvantaged communities, identified with CalEnviroScreen.  
2016 SB 1000 requires city and county planning bodies to incorporate EJ into land use decisions 
 
California also makes an effort to better understand the implications of air pollution. For 
example, in 2000 CARB started a Children’s Environmental Health Protection Program, in 
which six communities were chosen for a longitudinal study on the impact of air pollution on 
children’s health and development. Perhaps ironically, one of the communities chosen was Boyle 
Heights, in the 70-100 percentile in CalEnviroScreen, directly north of Vernon, and deeply 
affected by Exide’s facility.  
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Finally, just a few months prior to this writing, California passed SB 1000, which 
requires cities and counties to take environmental justice under consideration in their land use 
decisions. The implications have yet to be seen, but hopefully will begin to redistribute 
environmental harms more equitably, if not eliminate them altogether. 
In short, California has pioneered advances in vehicle emission controls, air toxics, and 
control of stationary sources before federal efforts in these areas were cemented in law. The short 
timeline given (Table 2.1) barely skims the surface of this history, and in fact there are other 
agencies and regulatory bodies indirectly linked to the cases at hand that have been left out, such 
as the California Air Pollution Control Officers Association (CAPCOA), a non-profit association 
formed in 1976 that consists of representatives from all 35 local air quality agencies throughout 
California. Each agency has numerous domains it oversees, and all work together to greater or 
lesser degrees, as is reflected in Table 2.2 (following page).  
All of these agencies are targets for policy change, as well as agents that can enact changes. 
Given that many of them have the ability to set regulations, allocate funding, ensure enforcement, 
et cetera, they can assert considerable power over the issues at hand. It also raises the distinction 
between the policy itself and its implementation. Most agencies are involved in both processes, 
providing consultation, advocacy, and information to lawmakers while also setting many of the 
nitty-gritty details of public policy. Government institutions are the frontline responders. While 
they are often far from perfect, these agencies are crucial to understanding the outcomes of 
industrial health crises.  
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Table 2.2. Agencies involved in Aliso Canyon and Exide Technologies crises  
Entity Scope Parent Agency, Jurisdiction, and Responsibilities  
CalEPA CA State 
Agency 
California Department of Environmental Protection 
Contains six main sub-agencies responsible for implementing and 
enforcing environmental law: California Air Resources Board (CARB); 
Department of Pesticide Regulation; Department of Resources Recycling 
and Recovery (CalRecycle); Department of Toxic Substances Control 
(DTSC); Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA); 
and State Water Resources Control Board. 
CalOES  CA State 
Agency 
California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. 
Coordinates information sharing and action among governmental 
agencies in emergency situations, as well as proactively addressing 
homeland security, criminal justice, victim services, and public safety 
communications.  
Cal/OSHA 
or DOSH 
CA State 
Agency 
Division of Occupational Safety and Health (part of CA Department of 
Industrial Relations). 
Protects public health and safety through research and regulation related 
to workplace hazards, including facility air quality and exposure to air 
contaminants 
CARB CA State 
Agency  
California Air Resources Board (part of CA Environmental Protection 
Agency (Cal/EPA)). 
Responsible for regulating air quality throughout California, specifically 
mobile sources of pollution (e.g. vehicles).  
CEC  CA State 
Agency 
California Energy Commission (part of CA Natural Resources Agency).  
Responsible for forecasting and planning for future energy needs and 
maintaining the California Energy Code, in coordination with the CPUC.  
City of 
Vernon 
Local 
Gov’t 
Government of City of Vernon. 
Manages municipal services including Police Department and Fire 
Department, highly unusual for a city so small.  
City of 
Los 
Angeles 
Local 
Gov’t 
Government of City of Los Angeles. 
Manages municipal services including LA Police Department and Fire 
Department. Headed by Mayor Eric Garcetti.  
County of 
Los 
Angeles 
Local 
Gov’t 
Government of County of Los Angeles. 
Responsible for county services including elections, voter registration, 
law enforcement, jails, property records, public health, health care, and 
some social services. The County Board of Supervisors serves as the 
local government for all unincorporated areas. 
CPUC CA State 
Agency 
California Public Utilities Commission. 
Regulates privately owned utilities in the state of California, including 
electric power and natural gas. 
Continued next page 
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Table 2.2. Continued from previous page 
Entity Scope Parent Agency, Jurisdiction, and Responsibilities  
DOGGR CA State 
Agency  
Department of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (part of Department 
of Conservation, California Natural Resources Agency). 
In charge of monitoring oil and gas extraction and storage facilities in 
order to enforce state regulations. Carries out inspections and manages 
mandatory reporting from oil and gas operators.  
DTSC CA State 
Agency 
Department of Toxic Substances Control part of California 
Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA)). 
Produces and enforces regulations relating to the generation, handling, 
treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste in CA, and is involved in 
cleanup of contaminated sites. Works closely with federal laws and EPA. 
LAUSD Local 
Gov’t 
Los Angeles Unified School District (part of the City of Los Angeles).  
Operates and creates policy for public schools in the City of Los Angeles, 
including decisions about fitness of facilities for students’ health.  
OEHHA  CA State 
Agency  
Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (part of CA 
Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA)). 
Evaluates health risks from environmental chemical contaminants, and 
has a technical and advisory role in regulatory decision-making.  
SCAQMD Southern 
California 
Agency 
South Coast Air Quality Management District. 
Responsible for regulating air quality and stationary pollution sources 
(e.g. factories, refineries) in the South Coast District, which includes 
Orange County and non-desert regions of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, 
and Riverside Counties.  
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Chapter Three 
Exide Technologies 
“I think we are looking at one of the largest public health disasters in the state’s history.” 
Gladys Limon, lawyer with Communities for a Better Environment 
Quoted by Southern California Public Radio (Peterson, 2015).  
To stand in Vernon, California is to be assaulted by the smell. Odors from rendering plants 
and hundreds of other industrial facilities swirl in the air, nauseating and inescapable, floating 
through the streets that once were home to Exide Technologies’ lead battery recycling plant. The 
facility was shut down in March 2013, more than two years after a mandated Health Risk 
Assessment (HRA) report indicated increased risk of cancer from arsenic emissions to 110,000 
residents living in the surrounding area (see Figure 3.1). The revelation put the neighboring 
communities and policy makers in crisis mode and catalyzed a long, painfully slow response from 
public policy-makers as revelation after revelation about the permitting status, operating practices, 
and emissions at the Vernon facility came to light.  
Local communities had a long history of activism and organizing, and public pressure 
forced regulators to suspend operations at the plant. Soon after, Exide filed for bankruptcy for the 
second time since 2000, when it purchased the Vernon facility. Finally, a 2015 legal agreement 
permanently shuttered the plant but released Exide from criminal liability (Barboza & Vives, 
2015). Vernon and the communities near Exide followed a long and crooked path to crisis. The 
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details of this case tell a story of residents at risk in economically, socially, and politically 
marginalized communities, with harmful outcomes for everyone involved.      
 
A local history  
The City of Vernon is a fascinating enclave. With a population of just 112, it exists 
specifically as a haven for industry, an early environmental sacrifice zone for economic gain 
(Lerner, 2010). It was founded in 1905 as an “exclusively industrial” city along a side railroad 
line running to and from downtown Los Angeles, just five miles away. Over the years, 
stockyards and meatpacking became key enterprises, slowly joined by a suite of other industries 
including steel and aluminum, manufacturing of boxes, paper, cans, and pharmaceuticals, and 
food processing. The construction of an independent power plant in the 1930s provided low-cost 
power, and along with low tax rates, has enticed new industrial development for over eighty 
years. Vernon currently supports more than 1,800 businesses and their approximately 50,000 
employees, and a total regional economic impact estimated at $5 billion (“History of Vernon,” 
undated; “About Vernon,” undated). The Vernon Chamber of Commerce claims that as industry 
grew, “a strong unionized work force developed, leading to excellent middle class incomes for 
thousands of area families (“History of Vernon,” undated). That is the postcard story of Vernon, 
but it is far from an accurate representation of the complexity of its history and the relationship 
between Vernon and surrounding communities (see Figure 3.1). Before delving into that 
relationship, it is necessary to explore the history of those neighboring communities.    
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Figure 3.1a (left). Los Angeles County. City of LA in red; other cities in gray; yellow star at Exide 
Technologies. Adapted from Wikimedia Commons. 3.1b (right). Vernon and surrounding neighborhoods. 
Exide Technologies marked with red star. Adapted from the LA Times’ Mapping LA project.  
 
 
These communities, which include Maywood, Boyle Heights, East LA, Bell, and 
Commerce, have many hallmark characteristics of vulnerability (see Table 3.1). The vast 
majority of residents are Latinx, and average income, age, and educational attainment are all low. 
Many are immigrants, often with limited English language skills. The public schools are 
struggling, with only 10 of 58 schools achieving an Academic Performance Index (API)7 score 
of at least an 8/10, and the majority scoring less than a four. These factors alone suggest that 
health outcomes may be worse in southeast LA compared to other areas in Los Angeles 
(Morello-Frosch, Zuk, Jerrett, Shamasunder, & Kyle, 2011; O’Neill et al., 2003). Although 
specific information is not available, given the 55,000 blue collar jobs in Vernon (Williams, 
2011), many residents from surrounding communities are likely economically dependent on its 
employment opportunities, either directly with Exide or with a similar facility. 
                                                          
7 API (Academic Performance Index) is a metric used by the State of California, under the 1999 Public Schools 
Accountability Act, which measures schools’ academic performance and growth on a variety of parameters. All 
school statistics in this paper include a one-mile radius around the neighborhood/city in question, except Vernon, 
which has no schools. The last year of API scores is 2013.  
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Table 3.1. Demographics of Vernon and surrounding communities  
City of 
Vernon 
Boyle 
Heights 
City of 
Commerce 
Maywood Bell City of Los 
Angeles† 
Total Population*  94 92,756 12,583 28,083 36,667 3,790,000 
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
, 
%
 
White 2.1 2.0 4.4 2.8 5.9 29 
Asian  0 2.4 1.1 0.2 1.2 11 
Black  0 0.9 0.4 0 0.8 10 
Latino/a 93 94 93 96 91 49 
Other 5.3 0.7 0.8 0.5 1.4 5 
Foreign born 9.61 521 391 551 531 39 
Median age (yr) 21 25 27 23 24 35 
Have less than a high 
school diploma, % 40.9 68.8 54.2 70.4 64.9 25.1 
Have 4-year degrees, 
% 
18.2 5.0 4.6 2.3 4.0 31.5 
Median household 
income, $ 81,279 33,235 46,245 41,203 40,566 49,682 
Households earning 
less than $20,000, % 8.3 40.9 28.3 36.8 28.9 22.4
‡ 
* In 2008, LA Department of City Planning estimates 
† All data from 2010 census 
‡ In poverty (usually more than $20,000) 
1 Predominantly from Mexico and some from El 
Salvador 
 
Yet, it is also necessary to move beyond demographics to explore the creation of place. 
Part of the explanation of the Exide crisis, as is often the case in environmental injustices, lies in 
the history of the affected communities (Pulido, 2000). I look in particular at Boyle Heights, a 
neighborhood in Los Angeles city proper, and East LA, a misleadingly-named unincorporated 
area just to the east of Boyle Heights (Benitez, 2004; Reft, 2013). This is not to diminish the 
importance of the other communities in the area, but rather to follow where the most media 
coverage and in some cases the highest impacts have been found. 
When the original settlements in the Los Angeles area changed hands after the Mexican-
American war, it unleashed “a period of anti-Mexican sentiment that left the population 
impoverished and strangers in their own homeland” (Benitez, 2004). Mexican Americans were 
pushed out of the city and across the river to Boyle Heights and East Los Angeles, joined in the 
following decades by African Americans, European immigrants, Japanese, Chinese, and 
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Armenians, among others, as LA’s growing industrial center attracted migrants, gradually 
creating multiracial and ethnic working-class communities (Reft, 2013). During the first half of 
the twentieth century, Jewish immigrants fleeing Europe and Mexicans fleeing the Revolution 
immigrated to the area for its inexpensive housing, employment opportunities, and relative social 
tolerance. After WWII, with the national reconsideration of who was “white” and changing 
housing segregation patterns (Reft, 2013), many Jewish families relocated out of East LA. At the 
same time, continued immigration from Mexico cemented eastern LA as the largest Hispanic 
community in the US. Although many residents remained laborers, the culture, commerce, and 
traditions of the area gave the community vibrancy, and a small home-owning middle class 
flourished (Benitez, 2004). 
It is critical to note that Boyle Heights, unlike unincorporated East LA, had voting power 
within the City of Los Angeles. In 1949 its residents used it to propel Edward R. Roybal to the 
LA City Council as its first non-white and first Mexican American member. Both Boyle Heights 
and East LA were influenced by the postwar activism of the ‘60s and ‘70s and struggled against 
ongoing lags in “educational opportunity, employment, economic opportunity, political 
representation, and all the social trappings of fully recognized, empowered citizens” (Benitez, 
2004). These issues and the tradition of community activism remain today, and are partially 
manifested in a number of environmental justice organizations such as East Yard Communities 
for Environmental Justice, Communities for a Better Environment, Mothers of East Los Angeles, 
Union de Vecinos, and others. But the impact of being unincorporated also remains: residents do 
not have any directly elected representatives below the county level, and given the sheer size of 
LA County, their needs and desires may be left aside. Furthermore, the current population in all 
of Southeast Los Angeles – Boyle Heights, East LA, Maywood, Bell, Huntington Park, 
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Commerce, Vernon – includes a large number of undocumented residents, who do not have the 
ability to vote, and may also be deterred from certain forms of protest and engagement because 
of their status.  
How does this history intersect with that of Vernon, the industrial city on their southern 
borders? The foundation of Vernon was influenced by the low cost of the land, the railroad, and 
possibly by the availability of laborers living close by. Since then, the fact that Vernon is 
independently incorporated means it is largely able to set its own rules, with disastrous 
consequences for neighboring communities. The city government is what Evan Hessel, writing 
for Forbes (2007), called a “benign dictatorship.” Two families, headed by Mayor Leonis 
Malburg (descended from one of Vernon’s founders) and City Administrator Bruce Malkenhorst, 
have controlled the city for decades, and “[they] run a nice little business. As of 2005 Vernon 
had $164 million in cash and liquid assets” for just 112 residents, and city leadership purportedly 
receives generous compensation (Hessel, 2007). All housing in Vernon is owned by the city, so 
attempts at opposing Malburg or Malkenhorst have been shut down by kicking the new candidate 
out of their house and thus the city.  
In 2006, LA County took action against a few of the individuals running the city, 
charging them with minor infractions including voting in Vernon but living elsewhere and 
receiving inappropriate reimbursements from the city (Becerra, 2006). In 2011, Rep. John Perez 
introduced a bill to dissolve Vernon’s city charter. Senator Kevin de León, a co-author, shifted 
his position to support extensive reforms in order to protect the thousands of jobs in the city. The 
bill did not succeed (Williams, 2011). Neither effort re-established a functional democracy in 
Vernon, and with so much money flowing through the city, it is entirely possible that any 
successors would follow a similar pattern of corruption. This leaves surrounding residents with 
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little recourse as “Vernon [continues] to create spoils for a few and a toxic stench for everyone 
else” (Hessel, 2007). The question is not whether Vernon was sited close to communities of 
color or whether they subsequently moved in for low-cost housing and jobs (Pulido, 2000); as 
the narratives given above show, these histories are intertwined in complex ways.  
The final thread of this story is the relationship between the communities of Southeast 
LA and the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC), the regulatory agency responsible 
for monitoring non-airborne toxic contamination. A long history of failures to pursue violations, 
failure to collect appropriate fines, and inadequate collaboration with communities (Garrison, 
Christensen, & Poston, 2013) contributed to a serious deficiency of trust between residents in 
Southeast LA and DTSC and accusations of environmental racism (EGP Staff, 2015). Given the 
density of industrial operations in Vernon, Exide was not the first nor the last interaction between 
communities and DTSC, and in the case of Exide, they have poured considerable resources into 
rebuilding those bridges (personal communication, DTSC staff).   
These narratives and the current unjust situation illustrate the necessity of including 
historical context and an environmental justice framing when analyzing the outcomes of 
industrial health crises, and should be used to inform the future. Vernon is able to export its 
industrial externalities to neighboring communities, since they have functionally no voice in how 
the city is run. Vernon has little incentive to clean up its act, since its leaders and its businesses 
receive significant benefit from the status quo. The surrounding communities lose out. The 
spatial politics of Vernon is crucial to understanding how a disaster like Exide came to be, and 
why nearby communities were, and still are, uniquely vulnerable to such events.  
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Progression of events 
 Detailed histories and timelines of the Vernon facility have been compiled by Southern 
California Public Radio (SCPR) and the LA Times8 as living public resources, and will not be 
reproduced here. I highlight certain elements in order to contextualize and detail the policy 
responses to the ongoing crisis, and add key media coverage. Except where otherwise noted, the 
LA Times and SCPR timelines are the source for the following narrative, corroborated by 
primary documents from governmental agencies.  
 The facility that later became the center of the Exide Technologies crisis was converted 
into a lead-acid battery recycling facility in 1981 by Gould Inc. (Gould National Batter, GNB), 
under an “interim status document” from the California Department of Health Services, the 
precursor to the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC). Soon after DTSC found high 
levels of lead contamination and indications of intentional leaking in 1999, the entire company 
was sold to Exide Technologies, an expanding lead battery manufacturer.  
 When Exide took the plant over in 2000, there was already a history of infractions. 
Although it took steps to improve pollution control systems, from 2000 to 2013 it accrued dozens 
of violations and was charged over $726,000 in fines and reimbursements to DTSC and AQMD. 
Violations ranged from lead contamination in drainage channels and lead dumping in the LA 
River to numerous air quality violations relating to excessive releases of contaminants including 
lead.9 A 2006 attempt to regularize the plant’s permit failed because of extensive negative public 
                                                          
8 Available online at http://projects.scpr.org/timelines/exide-shutdown-timeline/ (Southern California 
Public Radio) and http://timelines.latimes.com/exide-technologies-history/ (Los Angeles Times).  
9 DTSC Inspection Reports for Exide from 1996 to 2015, compiled by Los Angeles Times reporter Tony 
Barboza, available at http://documents.latimes.com/exide-inspection-reports/. DTSC enforcement 
information can be found using ID: EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES INC (CAD097854541) at 
http://www.envirostor.dtsc.ca.gov/public/. AQMD Notices to Comply and Notices of Violation can be 
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feedback (DTSC, 2011), and was followed two months later by a $25,000 fine from DTSC for a 
series of violations in 2005 involving improper storage and handling of hazardous materials 
(DTSC, 2006).  
In late 2007, falling ash and damage to nearby cars prompted community complaints. A 
resulting regulatory check revealed lead emissions at nearly twice the allowable levels for over 
four months. AQMD ordered Exide to reduce its production by half, along with ordering a 
number of specific changes to reduce emissions. These events were a key juncture. The original 
complaint in this incident was filed by Dr. Joseph Lyou, an activist from the Coalition for Clean 
Air and member of the Board of Governors of AQMD. For years, area residents had been aware 
of the poor air quality – not the least because of smells unrelated to Exide’s facility – yet this 
potential focusing event for the most part faded away.  
In particular, there was almost no media coverage; in searching news archives, only one 
LA Times article (Wilson, 2008) and no articles from SCPR or Eastern Group Publications, a 
group of local papers in Southeast LA, were found. The lone LA Times article reported that 
SCAQMD had air quality monitoring equipment in place, was aware of Exide’s emissions, 
ordered a cut in production to reduce lead emissions, and assessed a fine against Exide (Wilson, 
2008), which Exide contested. At the end of 2009, SCAQMD put air monitoring equipment at 
Resurrection Catholic School in Boyle Heights. Its preliminary results in March 2010 suggested 
that lead emissions from Exide, the main lead source in the area, were well within regulatory 
limits (Castillo, 2010). Later in 2010, SCAQMD decreased this limit on lead emissions from lead 
battery recyclers (Roosevelt, 2010).  
                                                          
accessed via online search at http://www3.aqmd.gov/webappl/nov/. Neither source lists whether fines 
were assessed nor fine amounts.  
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Residents were present at meetings, concerned about air quality and their health, and 
Exide was on the radar. Pulido et al. (Pulido et al., 2016) point out that they had been engaged in 
air quality battles for decades, and had even tried to regularize Exide’s permit in a wider 
movement in 1992. Exide was the only one that did not ultimately get a full permit (Garrison et 
al., 2013). But communities were not in possession of all the information, or aware of the full 
extent of the risks. At the community meeting in which AQMD shared the results from the 
school-site air monitoring, residents were told that “emissions from cars and trucks continue to 
be the main air-quality concern throughout Southern California” (Castillo, 2010). And the wider 
public, media and policy community were completely unaware of the ongoing issues with Exide.  
 Thus the stage was set for the main focusing event: the January, 2013 Health Risk 
Assessment (HRA) report that indicated that cancer risks for over 110,000 nearby residents were 
raised by 22 additional cases in one million people. For workers, the risk was raised by 440 cases 
in a million. The public notification level is 10 cases, and the action level for a risk reduction 
plan is 25 cases (Exide Technologies, 2013). These risks were primarily from arsenic emissions, 
but the increased scrutiny on the facility led to discoveries of other violations. The HRA was the 
beginning of the slow end of decades of infractions and fines, yet it represented a crisis in the eye 
of the public and the affected communities. 
 Focusing events are harmful or reveal potential for future greater harms, are or could be 
concentrated on a definable geographic area or community, and are known to policy makers and 
the public roughly simultaneously (Birkland, 1997, p. 22). Given the regulatory history of 
Exide’s Vernon facility, local enforcement teams within SCAQMD and DTSC were at least to a 
degree aware of the potential risks it posed, and potentially negligent in not taking direct action 
sooner. Residents were aware of ash, smells, and other issues that potentially originated from 
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Exide but could not have known about the extent of invisible lead or arsenic emissions. While 
these risks may have been known to some enforcement officers, they were not known to the 
public, public health experts or local or state elected officials. The real function of the report was 
illustrating the degree to which Exide’s emissions were a problem, and to whom.  
 So what was the response? Table 3.2 outlines key events in the period after the report, 
climaxing with the closure of the facility, but far from ending there. The very length of this 
timeline – which excludes thousands of hours of community organizing and the efforts of local 
residents, a number of legal cases, and many other important facets of the saga – illustrates the 
protracted process of resolving the issues the Exide crisis raised.  
Table 3.2. Abridged timeline of events at Exide Technologies’ Vernon facility  
2013 
Jan. 15 The original report indicating elevated cancer risks to nearby residents and workers, 
“Revised AB2588 Health Risk Assessment” (HRA), is submitted to SCAQMD. The 
public is not immediately given information it contains, and it is two months before the 
HRA is approved and SCAQMD takes action. 
Feb. 22 Rep. Manuel Pérez introduces AB 1329, which would require DTSC to prioritize 
enforcement actions affecting the most impacted CalEnviroScreen communities. There is 
no evidence it was prompted by revelations about Exide. 
Mar. 24  The facility is ordered by SCAQMD to reduce its lead emissions and to hold public 
meetings to notify residents about the findings in the HRA.The Los Angeles Times, other 
local newspapers, and local radio stations report on the HRA and SCAQMD’s order.  
Apr. 24   In a highly unusual move, DTSC regulators order a suspension of operations at the Exide 
plant due to leaking pipes underneath the facility (Pulido, Kohl, & Cotton, 2016). Exide 
challenges this order in court. By July 2, the judge sides with Exide and allows it to 
resume operations pending a full hearing. 
Aug. 27 DTSC officials order Exide to begin testing dust and soil in surrounding homes to 
determine whether dangerous metals have accumulated. Initial results from 39 homes are 
not available until March 2014, and show elevated levels of lead in every home screened. 
Aug. 27 At this point, eleven articles in the Los Angeles Times have covered events regarding 
Exide, from the HRA, to temporary shutdown and ensuing legal battle, to lead testing. 
Sep. 12 The LA County Department of Public Health offers free blood testing for lead poisoning. 
This can only test exposure in the past six months. The first tests do not take place until 
April 2014, six months later.  
Sep. 19 and Oct. 3, Exide exceeds lead emissions limits; both are reported in LA Times.  
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Oct. 7 DTSC announces a deal with Exide to keep its Vernon plant open. DTSC will issue an 
order requiring Exide to clean up leaky storm pipes and control toxic air emissions. Exide 
will establish a $7.7 million fund to pay for cleanup of past violations, blood lead tests 
for local residents and workers, and other environmental tests. 
Oct. 18 SCAQMD lawyers petition the district’s hearing board to temporarily shut Exide down 
for “failing to adequately capture and control gaseous emissions from its blast and 
reverbatory furnaces, including...arsenic” (Christensen & Garrison, 2013)  
Dec. 19 DTSC issues emergency order directing Exide to clean up lead and other metals that have 
been deposited near its Vernon plant, saying rains could wash toxins into the LA River.  
Testimony on the SCAQMD petition calling for a shutdown at the facility is still being 
heard, including from residents with health concerns and Exide officials claiming that 
emissions have plummeted in recent months. 
Dec. 27 The LA Times publishes an exposé on DTSC, revealing many incidences of 
mismanagement, failure to recoup costs, and failure to enforce environmental regulations 
statewide (Garrison, Christensen, & Poston, 2013) 
2014 
Jan. 10 SCAQMD governing board votes unanimously to lower the allowable limits for arsenic, 
benzene, and 1,3-butadiene emissions from battery recyclers (rule 1420.1), with a 1-year 
full compliance window. It affects Exide, and Quemetco in the City of Industry.  
Exide does not challenge the new level, but sues in the LA Superior Court and directly to 
SCAQMD for more time for compliance. In April, the LA Superior Court ruled against 
Exide and AQMD denied its request for a hearing.  
A third violation in lead emissions since January 2013 is found. 
Jan. 16 DTSC requests an increase in state funding. SCAQMD files a civil suit for $40 million in 
penalties against Exide, alleging numerous violations for lead and arsenic emissions. 
On Feb. 18, 2014, the amount was increased to $60 million.  
On May 29, 2015, the amount was increased to $80 million.  
Jan. 23 Sen. Ricardo Lara of Bell Gardens introduces SB 712 in the State Senate, which would 
give DTSC until Dec. 2015 to regularize Exide’s Vernon permit. A second law, SB 812, 
broadly tightens DTSC permitting requirements.  
SB 712 is signed into law Sep. 19.  
Mar. 11 L.A. County announces the creation of a toxic pollution ‘strike team,’ with Exide first on 
its list. The team will include health officials, prosecutors and fire department officials. 
The strike team does not become active until mid-2016, and as of December 2016, scant 
information is available on its structure, members, or activities. 
Mar. 14 Exide facility is shut down to upgrades to comply with new regulations.  
Mar. 20 After three attempts, Exide and SCAQMD make a plan to reduce arsenic risks. 
SCAQMD is still trying to halt smelting operations until a long-term solution is found. 
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Mar. 21 Initial residential lead testing shows elevated levels of lead at all 39 homes and two 
schools screened, prompting plans for a second round of testing.  
The first soil removals, in Boyle heights, begin in August.  
Mar. 28 LA Times reports Exide’s emissions once again exceed regulatory thresholds. It was not 
operating at the time, and may be from disturbing lead-containing dust (Garrison, 2014) 
By the end of March, close to the one-year anniversary of SCAQMD’s original emission 
reduction order, the LA Times has published close to 40 articles about Exide. 
Apr. 9 SCAQMD denies Exide’s petition to resume smelting operations 
May 2 DTSC Director Debbie Raphael steps down. Sen. De León commented, “The departure 
of such a highly-qualified leader…indicates to me that DTSC may be beyond repair…it's 
time for a major restructuring of DTSC” (Barboza & Garrison, 2014). 
The new Director, Barbara Lee, is not appointed until October. She is the eighth Director 
of DTSC in eleven years (Garrison et al., 2013). 
May 22 Federal EPA gets involved, issuing a citation for lead emissions violations under the 
FCAA on more than 30 occasions (various days from Sep. 9 2013 to Apr. 19 2014).In 
August, they begin inspections of Exide, which continue for at least seven months. 
June 17 DTSC sets 30-day deadline for Exide to fix its permit or lose permission to handle 
hazardous waste at its Vernon facility.  
On July 11, the facility is allowed to reopen, with stipulations for new pollution controls. 
July 24 LA Times publishes an editorial lambasting DTSC and supporting SB 812 (LA Times 
Editorial Staff, 2014), and Aug. 7 publishes an audit of their financial mismanagement 
(Barboza, 2014). 
Aug. 11 The LA County Board of Supervisors writes a letter to Gov. Jerry Brown criticizing 
DTSC for slow progress in testing and clean-up of lead around Exide. It asks the 
governor to ensure the cleanup of all 39 homes near Exide with elevated levels of lead. 
Sep. 29 With both SB 712 and SB 812 on his desk, Governor Jerry Brown signs SB712 into law.  
Nov. 6 The state orders Exide Technologies to pay for the cleanup of homes and yards 
contaminated by its battery recycling plant in Vernon. Regulators fine Exide $526,000 
for improperly managing hazardous waste.  
2015 
Jan. 9 Sen. De León, Sen. Lara, and Rep. Santiago introduces a bill to borrow $176.6 million 
from the state general fund for testing and cleanup around Exide and to implement a job 
training program. It takes more than a year to pass and be approved by the Governor.  
Mar. 6 SCAQMD again lowers emissions standards on lead battery recyclers, affecting only 
Exide and Quemetco of the City of Industry. Senate President Pro Tem Kevin de León 
writes to DTSC, urging them to permanently close down Exide's Vernon facility. 
Mar. 12 Exide Technologies will permanently close its Vernon plant and avoid criminal charges 
under an agreement with the U.S. attorney’s office. An additional $38.9 million will be 
added to the existing cleanup fund for the facility itself, bringing the total to $50 million.  
May 28 DTSC forms Exide Advisory Group (EAG) to oversee the community cleanup process. 
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
July 1 Governor Brown signs 2015-16 budget. It includes $13 million budget increase for DTSC 
to support permitting and hazardous waste oversight, and establishes a 3-member 
oversight panel. DTSC will fund a new assistant director for EJ and new positions to 
monitor hazardous waste facilities. These reforms were spearheaded by Sen. De León, 
Sen. Lara, other Exide-area legislators, community activists, and state EJ organizations. 
Aug. 21 DTSC announces $7 million for Exide, borrowed from budgeted cleanups at other sites; 
community members continue to criticize the pace of testing and cleanup. 
Oct. 29 Residents within 1.7 miles of Exide can sign up for residential lead testing online.  
2016 
Jan. 14 Martinez publishes her article, “Exide, Porter Ranch: A Double Standard?” The idea is 
more widely disseminated two weeks later by the Los Angeles Times.  
Feb. 19 Rep. Gatto introduces AB 2748, which applies only to Exide and Aliso, and would 
expand victims’ ability to claim compensation.  
AB 2748 is vetoed by Gov. Brown on Sep. 26.  
Apr. 20 Governor Brown approves $176.6 million “loan” for Exide cleanup; regulators hope to 
recover costs from Exide Technologies. Original proposal exempted the cleanup from the 
lengthy requirements of CEQA, but subsequent discussions reinstated the requirements.10  
Nov. 30 As of almost four years after the HRA, the LA Times has published approximately 90 
articles on Exide, DTSC, and toxics control in the state of California. 
 At several points in the time frame overviewed in Table 3.2, Exide’s emissions exceeded 
3-month total emissions limits, and its operators voluntarily stopped operations in order to 
comply.  Regulators also learned about other ways in which Exide was violating environmental 
regulations, such as trucks leaking toxic waste in the Exide yard and on highways, and damaged 
pipes under the facility. Yet these regulators did not immediately notify the public. This lack of 
transparency hearkens back to the community’s issues with DTSC and raises the question of 
institutional trust, one aspect of industrial health crises that shapes how they operate as focusing 
events, as will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
                                                          
10 The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires any project affiliated with the State to complete an 
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) outlining potential environmental impacts of the project, alternatives and plans 
for mitigation. Here, the issues involved in remediation are substantial, which is why some argued for the 
completion of the EIR, but it is a lengthy process that is further slowing down cleanup efforts. 
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To address the problems at Exide, government agencies (SCAQMD, DTSC), private 
parties, and federal prosecutors all pursued limited legal actions. Multiple class action lawsuits 
were filed and some were consolidated, resulting in a $14.75 million settlement with the 
plaintiffs in March 2016 (Meyer, 2016), which does not begin to cover estimated clean-up costs 
of over $400 million (Barboza, 2016). In August 2014, a federal grand jury subpoenaed Exide 
for documents about transportation of hazardous materials and air emissions for a criminal 
investigation. This information was only released in a financial disclosure to the federal 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the case was settled with the closure of the 
Vernon facility in exchange for exemption from criminal liability. A third case, filed in the LA 
Superior Court by families affected by the pollution, alleged that Exide officials willfully 
endangered the health of more than 60 children living near the Vernon facility (Christensen & 
Barboza, 2014). Although these legal settlements were doubtlessly important in achieving some 
compensation for some residents and workers affected by Exide, they do not carry larger policy 
implications and therefore will not be further discussed.  
 
Outcomes 
“Se me murió mi señora, se me murió mi cuñado… yo no quiero que muera más gente. 
Esto es lo que pido de ustedes.”  
Translation: “I have lost my wife and my brother-in-law… I don’t want more people to 
die. This is what I ask of you.”  
Maywood resident Marcelo Hernández, 
quoted in StreetsBlogLA and described as “visibly unwell” (Sulaiman, 2014) 
 
 Various aspects of the vulnerability of the communities that Exide impacted have been 
discussed: low incomes, communities consisting almost entirely of Latinx residents, many of 
whom are immigrants and/or have low language proficiency, low educational attainment, 
economic dependence on the origin of risk, and unincorporated residential neighborhoods. I will 
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analyze the role of these community characteristics in relation to industrial health crises in Porter 
Ranch and the neighborhoods surrounding Vernon in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
In addition, the lead and arsenic released by Exide has meant that a number of homes in 
the area require extensive, costly cleanup. For the working class people who own these homes, 
the achievement of home-ownership, a mark of success and crucial pathway to intergenerational 
wealth building, becomes a nightmare as property loses value and assets evaporate. At an Exide 
Advisory Group (EAG) meeting, the LA County Assessor’s Office and EAG members reported 
that housing prices have not fallen,11 but have also not risen at the breakneck pace of other 
comparable Los Angeles housing stock (Prang, 2016), although I have not found secondary 
confirmation of these facts. Without these assets, many are trapped in homes they know are 
toxic, compounding their exposure, particularly for those with children. Unlike in Porter Ranch, 
where relocation was arranged for the duration of the crisis and where long-term contamination 
is not likely to be persistent (AQMD, 2016), in Boyle Heights and East LA, many are completely 
unable to relocate, and the crisis is permanent.  
This is part of the reason that criminal liability is important. Regulatory action and 
current civil cases have provided some funds for cleanup, but not enough to cover the impacts of 
the contamination. Criminal cases would both answer communities’ feelings that they have been 
cheated and abandoned, and a strong basis for further civil damages for affected residents. As it 
is, families are left with almost no recourse for their loss. The public agencies that both 
“allowed” Exide to pollute and that agreed to a deal which precluded criminal liability are 
                                                          
11 This is a tricky issue in California. Proposition 13 (1978) established that property taxes would be 
assessed on market value at purchase and could only increase by 2% per annum. Thus, especially in the 
Los Angeles area, assessed values are often lower than market values, so for any long-held property, even 
if the assessed value drops, it may not drop so far as the original market price. That being said, the 
Assessor’s office found that out of 5253 properties examined, only 23 warranted a “value reduction” 
resulting in a property tax decrease. 
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complicit in this outcome, yet for the most part, such agencies are also immune from liability. To 
be fair, agencies’ actions are circumscribed by the need to obtain any cleanup funds from the 
responsible company, by existing laws and procedural requirements, and by their own capacity. 
This balancing act illustrates the delicate role that agencies play as both contributors to, and 
mediators in the resolution of industrial health crises, and thus the limits of regulatory solutions. 
For Exide’s Vernon plant in particular, it is still unclear whether the facility was nearly 
continuously in violation of air quality standards, as it appears, and this led to the extreme 
contamination of soil, or whether such levels would be possible even had they been within 
regulatory limits; Exide itself argues that the contamination cannot be squarely blamed on them 
(Small & Rose, 2015). This contestation over the causes and effects of pollution is one important 
aspect of industrial health crises that affects their ability to operate as focusing events; the 
dissensus over the crisis itself leads to complications in responses (see p. 68 for further 
discussion). 
As of November 2016, nearly four years after Exide gave the initial report to SCAQMD, 
the process of completing health and residential soil screenings is ongoing. DTSC has tested 
2,711 properties for lead, out of approximately 10,000 in the Preliminary Area of Investigation 
(PIA; see Figure 3.2, following page), which includes all properties within 1.7 miles of Exide. 
The results are grim. Any soil with lead levels over 80 parts per million (ppm) necessitates 
further testing, and 2,655 houses exceed this limit. Anything between 400-1000 ppm is 
hazardous in areas with children, and 743 houses fall in this range. Any soil with lead 
concentration greater than 1000 ppm is hazardous in all situations, and 52 houses exceed this 
limit. Cleanup is ongoing, but the cost for full cleanup is estimated to be $400 million, compared 
to the $176.6 currently provided (Barboza, 2016).   
Chittick • 47 
 
 
Figure 3.2 DTSC’s Preliminary Area of Investigation, from Exide Cleanup Fact Sheet (DTSC, 2016). 
The 5 (east-west) and the 710 (north-south interstates, and the Los Angeles River are visible. 
Community members are fed up and frustrated with the slow pace of cleanup and what 
they perceive as a lack of attention to a public health crisis. As one resident from unincorporated 
East LA with soil lead levels tested at more than 1200 ppm said, “I’m living in toxic dirt, and I 
feel like I’m being left in the dirt” (statement in public Exide Advisory Group meeting, Oct. 20, 
2016). As we shall see in the next chapter, all industrial health crises do not have outcomes like 
these. Porter Ranch, the neighborhood struck by the gas leak at the Aliso Canyon natural gas 
storage facility, was affected and treated very differently than the neighborhoods surrounding 
Vernon.  
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Chapter Four 
Aliso Canyon 
"The damage the gas has caused to residents, the environment, the economy, is unprecedented."  
Mitchell Englander, Los Angeles City Council representative for Porter Ranch 
Quoted in the Los Angeles Times (St. John & Walton, 2016) 
On October 23, 2015, residents of Porter Ranch thought their homes’ pipes were leaking 
natural gas. Multiple searches and checking outside did not identify the source of the smell, and 
within a few days, not only was the irritating odor persisting, it was getting worse. Residents 
developed nosebleeds and headaches, but calls to SoCalGas, the owner of the nearby natural gas 
storage facility, yielded no answers. 
It was indeed a massive gas leak from a failed well within the Aliso Canyon facility. 
Despite denials and obfuscation from SoCalGas and regulatory agencies including the 
Department of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR), SCAQMD, and CARB, 
SoCalGas and these agencies were already trying to characterize the leak and figure out how to 
plug it. But they had no success, and as residents’ suffering stretched into weeks, their calls for 
action grew louder. By November, hundreds of residents relocated, paid for by SoCalGas 
(Walton, 2015), and two local schools were also relocated after winter break (Blume, 2015).  
The technical challenges of plugging the leak caused continued delays, and it was not 
fully and finally plugged until February 18, 2016. An estimated 109,000 metric tons of methane 
and other gases had been released (CARB, 2016a). Residents returned home, but protests against 
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the gas company and demands for a permanent shutdown of the Aliso Canyon facility have 
continued a year after the original leak began. So what factors allowed Porter Ranch residents to 
move quickly after the leak began? In what ways do clean-up and closure efforts parallel and 
diverge from events regarding Exide? What have been the policy ramifications of the leak? 
 
A local history           
 Aliso Canyon is located in the Santa Susana Mountains, the northern boundary of the San 
Fernando Valley, northeast of downtown of Los Angeles. According to government records 
(Baker, 2014; Division of Oil and Gas, 1959; DOGGR, n.d.), in 1938, J. Paul Getty's Tidewater 
Associated Oil Company developed the canyon for fossil fuel production. By the late 1950s, 
there were 118 active wells on the site, managed by multiple different companies (see Figure 
4.1). The well that failed in the 2015 leak, SS-25, was drilled in 1953. The site has been 
productive ever since, though decreasingly so, and to this day has active oil wells (Baker, 2014). 
In fact, a 2014 proposal by the Termo Company to drill 12 new wells in the field is what 
catalyzed the formation of Save Porter Ranch (SPR), a local organization that has worked to 
mobilize the community against the oil and gas development in the Aliso Canyon field.  
In 1973, SoCalGas’s predecessor, Pacific Lighting, purchased the partially-depleted field 
and refitted it for natural gas storage, including well SS-25. In natural gas storage, appropriate 
geologic sites can hold natural gas until it is needed for energy production. Often depleted oil or 
gas fields work well, because they have the required rock structure: capacity to hold gas and 
impermeable layers to prevent leakage. The site became SoCalGas’s largest natural gas storage 
facility, providing the greater Los Angeles area with a reliable source of fuel even at peak 
demand (Baker, 2014; Division of Oil and Gas, 1959; DOGGR, n.d.).   
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Figure 4.1a (left): Los Angeles County. City of LA in red; other cities in gray; yellow star at Porter Ranch. Adapted 
from Wikimedia Commons. Figure 4.1b (right): Aliso Canyon Oil and Gas Field and Porter Ranch as of 
October 29, 2016. Adapted from DOGGR’s online well mapping tool (DOGGR, 2016) and LA City Council maps. 
Since Porter Ranch is a neighborhood of Los Angeles and not an incorporated entity, its boundaries are not defined 
and there is a portion south of the 118 Ronald Reagan Freeway (the bottom border here) that is often included.  
 
 
 
 
 
Concurrent to the development of Aliso Canyon into a gas storage field, the land nearby 
was gradually becoming populated (Nelson, 2007; Newman, 1999; “Porter Ranch,” n.d.). Prior 
to the 1960s, Porter Ranch was primarily home to horse ranches. But Los Angeles was a 
booming metropolis, and in that decade, the first houses were built in the hills directly south of 
the Aliso Canyon field. Major development began in the 1970s, when successful developer 
Nathan Shapell began building expensive suburban communities. According to the Los Angeles 
Times’s Mapping LA project, the community remains relatively affluent and well-educated (see 
Table 4.1). Porter Ranch also has excellent public schools; none have an Academic Performance 
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Index (API)12 score below 8/10, and four out of seven schools have a perfect 10/10. This is a 
clear contrast Southeast LA, where more than half of the schools had less than 4/10.   
Given the nature of the leak, the communities surrounding Porter Ranch may have also 
been exposed, though not to the same degree. Much less focus has been placed on them, and 
detailed exposure predictions are not available, although some did suffer similar symptoms and 
complain (see Fig 4.2). Regardless, it is worth noting that, according to the LA Times Mapping 
LA project, the neighborhood directly to the east of Porter Ranch, Granada Hills, has a lower 
median income, lower proportion of four-year university graduates, and greater proportion of 
households with incomes less than $20,000 a year (LA Times, 2010). Public schools are good, 
but not quite as good. In general, Chatsworth, the neighborhood to the west, is comparable.13 
Table 4.1. Demographics of Porter Ranch and surrounding neighborhoods  
Porter Ranch Granada Hills Chatsworth City of Los 
Angeles† 
Total Population*  30,571 53,998 37,102 3,790,000 
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
, 
%
 
White 61 56 66 29 
Asian  27 16 14 11 
Black  2 3 2 10 
Latino/a 8 21 14 49 
Other 3 4 4 5 
Foreign born 341 292 251 39 
Median age (yr) 41 37 40 35 
Have less than a high 
school diploma, % 7.0 13.0 10.9 25.1 
Have 4-year degrees, % 51.4 32.7 24 31.5 
Median household 
income, $ 121,428 83,911 84,456 49,682 
Households earning less 
than $20,000, % 6.6 11.9 11.5 22.4
‡ 
* In 2008, LA Department of City Planning estimates 
† All data from 2010 census 
‡ In poverty (usually more than $20,000) 
1 Most commonly from Korea and the Philippines 
2 Most commonly from Korea and Mexico 
                                                          
12 API (Academic Performance Index) is a metric formerly used by California under the 1999 Public Schools 
Accountability Act, which measures schools’ academic performance and growth on a variety of parameters. All 
school statistics in this paper include a one-mile radius around the neighborhood/city, except Vernon. 
13 Data for Chatsworth includes the westernmost part of Porter Ranch, due to the LA Times’ neighborhood map. 
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SoCalGas has been part of a parent company, now called Sempra Energy, since the 1920s. 
Sempra is a Fortune 500 energy services company which operates natural gas pipelines, gas-
operated power plants, and storage facilities. Kathleen Brown, Governor Jerry Brown’s sister, 
serves on the board of Sempra, which led to accusations that Gov. Brown put family ties and 
finances before the needs of his constituents. A graphic put together by LittleSis, an organization 
dedicated to visualizing the connections between organizations and people in power, illustrates 
numerous other financial and political ties between SCAQMD, the governor, legislators, and 
Sempra and SoCalGas.14 Alexandra Nagy, an organizer with Food and Water Watch (FWW) 
who has been working on organizing in Porter Ranch, was quoted in the LA Daily News: 
“Governor Brown’s silence on the Porter Ranch gas leak is immoral and egregious given his 
conflict of interest and close ties to Sempra… A real climate leader wouldn’t let family ties get 
in the way of protecting Californians from a massive public health and climate disaster” 
(Bartholomew & Knickmeyer, 2015).  
Nagy’s statement illustrates the current conflict over the facility, a conflict that is 
influenced by a number of key characteristics and historical interactions. The facility predates the 
community, and that its location is heavily circumscribed by specific geological formations, and 
cost and infrastructural need for proximity to the city. This is in contrast to many other 
potentially hazardous facilities, which have greater locational flexibility. However, SoCalGas 
itself provided evidence that the infrastructure at Aliso Canyon was not always well-maintained, 
and that issues with well failures and leaks had been increasing in recent years. Not one year 
                                                          
14 The map is available via http://littlesis.org/maps/1227-regional-air-quality-regulator-in-l-a-under-
scrutiny-for-lax-handling-of-socalgas-leak  
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before the leak, they presented before the CPUC on their plans for upgrades in response to the 
issues at their underground storage facilities (Baker, 2014). 
The development of Porter Ranch was not hindered by Aliso Canyon’s presence; if 
brought up at all, it was considered a non-issue, including by residents (Abrams, 2016). Despite a 
number of other social advantages that many Porter Ranch residents possess, and the activism of 
some residents through SPR, many were unaware of the facility. This lack of awareness 
precluded planning for potential risks. Such planning could have included air filter installations, 
emergency housing arrangements for those with poor health, response plans with SoCalGas and 
local government agencies, et cetera. None of this occurred.   
 Evaluating the impacts of the gas leak on residents of Porter Ranch is complex. There is 
no question that the gas leak had significant effects on local residents; many complained of the 
smell, suffered overt medical symptoms including nosebleeds, headaches, and nausea,  
symptoms of existing medical conditions were exacerbated. Many residents blame health issues, 
and even the death of pets, on the leak in ways that have not been epidemiologically linked to 
methane gas or mercaptans (the chemicals used to odorize natural gas), but epidemiological 
studies are sparse. Studies conducted by SoCalGas (McDaniel, n.d.) and multiple government 
agencies (AQMD, 2016; LA DPH, 2016; Monserrat [OEHHA], 2016) have stated that no lasting 
health impacts are expected from the leak.  
The response was high-powered and as noted above, culminated in the extremely 
expensive relocation of thousands of private citizens who lived in the afflicted area. The total 
final cost was $78 million (SoCalGas, 2016). This was likely facilitated by the connections of 
those in the community, and their relative political-economic power – for example, the quote at 
the opening of the chapter from Mitch Englander, the City Council representative for Porter 
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Ranch and nearby neighborhoods – which prevented continued exposure and the persistence of 
the risk. Porter Ranch, once it learned of the hazard through its own experiences and suffering, 
was able to end the risk by removing itself from the hazard. That being said, not all residents 
were able or willing to move, and a closer look at who was or was not able to relocate, to access 
reimbursement from SoCalGas or at the least home air purifiers, is important. Such a level of 
detail is not currently available, but it is worth investigating.  
At the same time, vulnerability of communities must also be understood in light of the 
outcomes of a crisis. Once the leak occurred, there were a number of branching possibilities for 
the outcomes, from no action to protect residents, through a spectrum of mitigation efforts, to 
complete evacuation of residents to eliminate the health hazard. This final option is what actually 
occurred. The relative political power and social mobility of the community enabled it to respond 
to the events faster and more thoroughly than other communities, a fact I will explore more later, 
but that I now consider in a discussion of vulnerability and context.   
 
Progression of events 
“This was supposed to be my home, I was supposed to retire here… I have become fearful… afraid 
to leave my house, afraid to stay in my house.” 
Porter Ranch community member, One Year Later protest (personal observation) 
When the gas leak was discovered on Friday, October 23, it was not immediately 
reported to any relevant agency, likely due to uncertainty about its severity. There were no 
injuries, fatalities, media coverage, or interruptions, so reporting was up to the discretion of the 
operator. Since the leak was in the storage facility itself, not in distribution pipelines, it was 
within the jurisdiction of DOGGR and not CPUC, and SoCalGas notified DOGGR the day after 
the leak began, although the original notification record was not found. The first mention in the 
public record is on October 25, two days after the leak started, in a notification to the California 
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Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) stating: “Leak from an existing Aliso Canyon gas storage 
well. No ignition, no injury. No media. Notification due to operator judgement only. Reported to 
DOGGR. Failure under investigation” (SoCalGas, 2015b). Residents were not officially notified 
about the leak at this point.  
However, residents could smell the gas and some were experiencing symptoms including 
dizziness, nausea, and headaches (Hawkins, 2015). On Monday, October 27, there were 
complaints from Porter Ranch residents to the CPUC: “There was a gas leak in Aliso Canyon 
Storage on 10/23/2015. Customer is smelling the gas and the leak has not been fixed yet” 
(CPUC, 2015), and SoCalGas publicly acknowledged the leak. The first mention found in media 
is the following day from KTLA, a local commercial news station, which reported that SoCalGas 
had sent representatives to talk to community members and was working with firefighters and 
schools to ensure public safety (Hawkins, 2015).  
In the following days, official information was still scarce. On October 30, Rosemary 
Jenkins, writing for LA Progressive, stated (2015): 
[A] previously announced meeting at Shepherd of the Hills Church was held right after 
[the] serious gas leak was discovered... Yet [SoCalGas]/Sempra did not address at that 
meeting the concerns over what is undoubtedly a serious incident. The company denies 
there is a problem, attributing what occurred to a “normal gas-releasing process” that is 
done once a month. Perhaps because of these staunch denials, it is impossible to find any 
coverage in our newspapers and television and radio media about it…The reality, 
however, shows otherwise. Community members have made every effort to contact the 
proper authorities for answers and actions. The Gas Company and the AQMD have 
finally gotten involved but claim they are waiting for a Texas expert to arrive to analyze 
the issue. 
At this point, residents had begun  protesting the leak and their inability to get information about 
it (Jenkins, 2015). Despite the lack of transparency, local governmental agencies were in fact 
already working with SoCalGas to evaluate the leak and its potential impacts. SoCalGas released 
an update that same day stating (2015a): 
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We are working with the L.A. City and County Fire and Hazmat Departments, the L.A. 
County Department of Health, the California Division of Oil and Gas & Geothermal 
Resources, and the South Coast Air Quality Management District – as well as world-
renowned experts in natural gas well management. 
None of these agencies have public documents available about their actions during this time,  
but well sampling data starting from October 30 is available from SoCalGas..15 Their actions 
over the next weeks became somewhat more transparent, although residents still felt that they 
were being manipulated, and that information was being withheld (personal observations, One 
Year Later protest). The first mainstream coverage did not appear until November 20, in the LA 
Times (Barboza, 2015b). By the end of November, residents had begun relocating of their own 
volition, and eventually over 8,000 households were living in temporary housing (McNary, 
2016b). Required to do so by a court case, SoCalGas paid for the housing, along with some food 
and gas costs, with an ultimate price tag over $58 million (McNary, 2016a). However, it is 
important to note that the very structure of these payments – residents could move then request 
reimbursements at fixed rates – meant that only certain families could afford to relocate. In this 
case, the “solution” worked because residents facilitated the cost coverage, which is not the case 
in the communities around Vernon.  
  
                                                          
15 Full sampling data from SoCalGas as well as CARB and SCAQMD:  
https://www.socalgas.com/newsroom/aliso-canyon-updates/aliso-canyon-air-sample-results  
https://www.arb.ca.gov/aqmis2/display.php?param=CH4&units=007&year=2015&report=SITE1YR& 
statistic=DAVG&site=5433&ptype=aqd  
http://www.aqmd.gov/home/regulations/compliance/aliso-canyon-update/air-sampling  
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Table 4.2. Abridged timeline of events at SoCalGas’s Aliso Canyon facility 
2014 
Apr., n.d. Save Porter Ranch (SPR) is created after Termo Company presents at a Porter Ranch 
Neighborhood Council meeting about drilling 12 new wells in the area. SPR soon partners 
with Food and Water Watch (FWW) to engage in local organizing.  
Aug. 15 Los Angeles Daily News covers a small protest against new drilling near Porter Ranch and 
publishes response letters over the next three weeks (Bartholomew, 2015). 
2015 
Oct. 23 Gas leak discovered and reported to DOGGR shortly thereafter. 
Oct. 26 Gas leak reported to CPUC. SCAQMD begins air sampling in response to community 
complaints; this occurs sporadically, but SCAQMD begins regular sampling Dec. 21. 
Oct. 27 Gas leak reported to CalOES / State Warning Center. 
Oct. 28 First very brief update from SoCalGas. First report found in the media (Hawkins, 2015), 
which mentions that SoCalGas representatives are hosting an informational booth in 
Porter Ranch. First mention in the LA Daily News is on Oct. 29 (Wilcox, 2015). 
Nov. 1 OEHHA begins air quality sampling above Aliso Canyon and Porter Ranch. 
Nov. 12 SoCalGas meets with Porter Ranch Neighborhood Committee, along with 
representatives from DOGGR, SCAQMD, LA County Fire Department (Health and 
Hazardous Materials Division), San Fernando Valley Field Deputy, County Supervisor, 
LA County Department of Public Health, and an environmental epidemiologist.  
Nov. 13 Attempts to plug the leak result in release of a mist of brine and drilling fluid over Porter 
Ranch; residents are cautioned to stay indoors for several hours.  
Nov. 19 Although SoCalGas has offered relocation support, few residents have done so. The LA 
County Dept. of Public Health orders SoCalGas to pay for relocation of residents. Within 
two weeks, over 30 families have relocated (Favot, 2015; Wilcox, 2015).  
Nov. 20 LA Times publishes first article on gas leak, and reports that SCAQMD has received 499 
odor complaints (Barboza, 2015b). 
Dec. 2 Class action lawsuit is filed by a group of Porter Ranch residents and Save Porter Ranch, 
later given support from famed environmental activist Erin Brockovich and from Robert 
F. Kennedy, Jr. (Favot, 2015b; R. Rex Parris Law Firm, 2015). 
LA Daily News article warns of potential long-term health effects from prolonged 
exposure to chemicals in leak (Favot, 2015). 
Dec. 4 Relief well drilling begins. Its estimated date of completion is in February.  
Dec. 7 Los Angeles City and County sue SoCalGas, with accusations of violating health and 
safety codes, public nuisance laws, hazardous materials reporting requirements, and 
engaging in unfair business practices, seeking civil penalties, restitution and injunctions.  
CARB begins aerial testing for potential GHG emissions impacts. 
Dec. 16 SCAQMD deploys two air monitoring trailers, one at LAUSD property and one in Porter 
Ranch (more specificity not given), to measure methane and other hydrocarbons. High 
methane readings trigger the collection of additional grab samples.  
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Dec. 17 LAUSD decides to relocate students from two schools after winter break ends on Jan. 12. 
Dec. 21 SCAQMD begins 24-hour integrated sampling, in which multiple samples are taken over 
a 24-hour period (see Footnote 4).  
Dec. 22 City of LA sues SoCalGas to increase the pace of resident relocations. 2,092 households 
have been moved and 2,684 households are awaiting relocation (Walton, 2015). 
2016 
Jan. 4 Governor Jerry Brown meets with Porter Ranch Neighborhood Council. 
Jan. 6 Gov. Brown declares state of emergency in Porter Ranch. Full details on p. 57.  
Jan. 8 SCAQMD Board of Governors unanimously approves measure advising that SoCalGas’s 
mandatory GHG mitigation project(s) be done for the benefit of Porter Ranch 
Jan. 11 SoCalGas begins 12-hour sampling at 9 locations within or adjacent to facility. 
Jan. 28 SoCalGas agrees to put air purifiers and filters in all schools within five miles, although 
most cannot smell the leak (Blume, 2016). 
The LA Times runs a story with narratives of Porter Ranch residents (Gerson, 2016). 
Feb. 2 L.A. County Dist. Atty. Jackie Lacey files 4 misdemeanor criminal charges against 
SoCalGas, accusing it of releasing air contaminants and neglecting to report the release 
of hazardous materials until three days after the leak began. 
State Atty. Gen. Kamala Harris joins in the civil suit pending in the LA Superior Court. 
bringing the total to 11 local, state, and federal agencies investigating or suing SoCalGas. 
Feb. 11 Leak is temporarily controlled via mud injection through relief well. 
Feb. 18 Leak is successfully permanently plugged. Residents are given eight days to move back 
from temporary housing; some still suffer adverse health effects.  
Feb. 25 An LA County judge orders SoCalGas to continue covering relocation costs for an 
additional 22 days, through March 18 (Sewell, 2016a). 
Mar. 4 DOGGR orders specific actions regarding the Aliso Canyon facility, including testing 
wells and installing new safety equipment (DOGGR, 2016). 
Mar. 18 Shortly before March 18, an agreement between residents and SoCalGas extends 
relocation funding an additional week (Sewell, 2016b). 
Mar, 31 The New York Times Magazine publishes “The Invisible Catastrophe” on the gas leak in 
Porter Ranch (Rich, 2016). 
Apr. 1 Pres. Obama convenes Interagency Task Force on Natural Gas Storage Safety (ITF)16   
SCAQMD approves $600,000 for health impacts study, in coordination with the 
National Academy of Sciences, but will seek cost reimbursement from SoCalGas. 
Continued next page 
                                                          
16 ITF included: Dept. of Energy, Dept. of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, federal EPA, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Dept. of Interior, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in collaboration 
with the State of California, Los Angeles County and the City of Los Angeles. Final report: 
https://www.alisoupdates.com/1443739975368/Reliable_Underground_Natural_Gas_Storage.pdf  
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Continued from previous page 
Apr. 8 A collaborative “Aliso Canyon Action Plan to Preserve Gas and Electric Reliability for 
the Los Angeles Basin” is released (California Department of Energy, 2016). 
May 11 OEHHA releases a study on their website indicating that residents have no expected 
long-term health impacts from the gas leak.  
May 20 An LA County Superior Court judge supports a LA Department of Public Health order 
for SoCalGas to pay to clean approximately 2,500 homes, if residents request it before 
they return from temporary housing (McNary, 2016b). In late May, cleaning was 
temporarily stopped due to concerns over the techniques and contractor being used. 
July 26 CARB removes six air quality monitors. SCAQMD is still operating two, in addition to a 
benzene monitor previously run by CARB (a second benzene monitor is removed).  
Sep. 13 SoCalGas settles criminal suit with $4 million payment (Walton, 2016). 
Oct. 18 The IFT releases its final report, with some suggestions for natural gas storage 
nationwide (ITFNGSS, 2016). 
Oct. 23 The one-year anniversary of the leak is commemorated with a protest and march to the 
gates of the Aliso Canyon facility, organized by SPR and FWW.  
As of one year after the leak, LA Times had published approximately 115 articles about 
the gas leak.  
Over the course of the leak, which continued for over three months, a significant amount 
of data about air quality was collected by SCAQMD, CARB, and SoCalGas itself (see Figure 
4.2). Few of the chemicals sampled, including benzene, a known carcinogen,  were ever found in 
excess of environmental standards (AQMD, 2016; Monserrat, 2016).  
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Figure 4.2. Map of air sampling sites for Aliso Canyon leak, publicly available from 
SCAQMD (SCAQMD, 2016). 
 
Just shortly before this report was released, Governor Brown issued a state of 
emergency declaration, stating that the government of California will:  
1. Take all viable actions to ensure that SoCalGas draws down gas levels in Aliso 
Canyon, captures leaking gases, and drafts more contingency plans; 
2. Require SoCalGas to do a comprehensive review of the safety of all wells and the 
air quality in the area, to expand real-time monitoring of emissions in Porter Ranch, 
to establish an independent public health panel of scientific and medical experts, 
and ensure the continued reliability of electricity supplies in LA;  
3. Ensure via CPUC that SoCalGas pays for the leak without passing costs on to 
ratepayers, and that they will develop a program to mitigate emissions;  
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4. Strengthen oversight via emergency regulations for gas storage operations in 
California, and require DOGGR, CPUC, and AQMD to prepare a report on the 
viability of natural gas storage in the state. 
 
Outcomes  
“Aliso Canyon was a wake-up call that revealed the disastrous consequences of not aggressively 
testing and monitoring our energy infrastructure”  
State Senator Fran Pavley, representing Porter Ranch 
Quoted on her website (Pavley, 2016) 
In sum total, as of September 2016, SoCalGas has paid more than $700 million in costs 
related to the leak (Walton, 2016). By about one month after the leak was sealed in February 
2016, the majority of residents had moved back in to their homes, but as of November 2016, not 
all residents have received reimbursements for their relocation. Public schools are back to 
normal; the relocation cost more than $5 million in total, but LAUSD expects to be compensated 
(Blume & Resmovits, 2016).  
Much like Southeast LA, the housing market has been affected. The median house price 
in Porter Ranch is $670,000, but in the year after the gas leak, the number of home sales 
dropped, and the rate of price increase was much slower than comparable areas of the San 
Fernando Valley area of LA. For example, Calabasas and Hidden Hills saw the median home 
price rise 30% compared to just 5.7% in Porter Ranch (Khouri, 2016).  
Air quality monitoring continues to be an issue. As government-organized sampling and 
testing slowed and then stopped, residents have struggled to keep their own, independent 
sampling stations open in order to hold SoCalGas accountable and to verify ongoing 
acceptability of air quality (Save Porter Ranch, n.d.).  
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There has also been a movement to close down the Aliso Canyon facility following the 
leak, spearheaded by SPR with support from FWW. The movement has supported by groups as 
far afield as New York (Steingraber, 2016). Such activism in the wake of any kind of industrial 
crisis is expected, but degree varies according to the community. Beck (1992) writes, “risk 
consciousness and activism are more likely to occur where the direct pressure to make a living 
has been relaxed or broken, that is, among the wealthier and more protected groups” (p. 53). 
Given the degree of separation between the community and the facility until the gas leak, 
perhaps this very compartmentalization contributed to the ultimate event. Had residents been 
more aware of the facility, they may have advocated for tighter regulations or more oversight. 
While there is evidence in the literature of successful local campaigns to hold facilities 
accountable (Bullard & Johnson, 2000; Lerner, 2010), the application to Porter Ranch is 
conjecture and there is no knowing whether their attempts would have prevented an eventual 
leak. Nonetheless it reiterates the importance of knowledge in counteracting vulnerability. Akin 
to the situation in Southeast LA, some residents were aware of some degree of hazard, but the 
extent was unclear until a focusing event brought it to attention. 
In the following chapter, the outcomes of both the Aliso Canyon gas leak and Exide’s 
HRA are analyzed as focusing events that drew public and governmental attention and catalyzed 
policy change. The degrees and mechanisms of these changes varied considerably, but the two 
cases illustrate a number of factors that set industrial health crises apart from other focusing 
events, and that can therefore shed light on theories of policy change.  
I don’t know but I’ve been told 
SoCalGas has got to go 
Stop the lies and stop the leaks 
Shut it (all) down that’s what we seek 
Our leaders need to grow a spine 
Our health is running out of time 
 - chant at One Year Later protest (personal observation) 
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Chapter Five 
Identifying Patterns in Policy Responses to the Case Studies 
 
 The communities in Southeast LA and Porter Ranch were differently vulnerable to the 
pollution they found themselves subject to, and their respective histories and social power and 
positionality played a role in the origins of the Aliso Canyon and Exide crises. Fundamentally 
and empirically, industrial health crises are much more likely in certain communities compared 
to others (Lerner, 2010). The particular vulnerabilities of each community were discussed in 
depth in Chapters 3 and 4.  In both cases, the residential and commercial facilities developed at 
approximately the same time and coevolved over decades, yet the two communities’ 
demographics, resources, and positionality differed in many significant ways.  
When each focusing event occurred, the responses varied widely. The case studies, as 
presented, can therefore offer insights into the characteristics of communities and events that 
shape the response of policy makers to industrial health crises, and thus, how such events act as 
focusing events. Although in many ways, both case studies are ongoing crises, the initial six 
month policy window that opened after the initial focusing event has long since closed. The 
longer-term implications may not be clear for some time. The following table (5.1) is a non-
exhaustive list of strategies and actions taken by regulatory agencies, the Legislature, and the 
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Governor’s office in one or both crises. Some are specific, stop-gap efforts (e.g. ordering the 
company to reduce emissions) while some indicate more systemic changes (e.g. changing 
emissions rules). Most are more opportunities for future policy improvements, rather than 
perfectly executed responses. A few actions were taken by both a public agency and by the 
company itself. For example, soon after the leak in Aliso started, SoCalGas set up a small booth 
by the facility entrance to talk to concerned residents.  
Note that the majority of these changes are at the governmental learning level, i.e. they 
are at the scale of actions, rules, and processes to support a specific policy instrument, rather than 
changing the instrument itself or its underlying justification. For example, there was little 
evidence that agencies changed the overall structure of permitting as a mechanism for 
enforcement; rather, both executive and agency actors actively decided against significant 
changes to the permitting structure, and instead made specific changes that only applied to Exide 
or Aliso Canyon. One example of an instrument change was the establishment of the LA County 
Strike Team. Although it took more than a year to become active, the Team is a newly created 
entity that will use a mix of incentives, negotiations, and interagency collaborations to prevent 
industrial health crises. More details on it are not available yet, as it is in its infancy, but it has 
the potential to change the occurrence and outcomes of industrial health disasters. The 
effectiveness of the team has yet to be seen, but it represents successful lesson-drawing from 
Exide, and potentially even social learning about best practices for avoiding environmental 
health and justice issues.  
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Table 5.1 Actions by governmental entities in response to Exide Tech. and Aliso Canyon 
 Type of 
action  
Examples 
Exide 
Tech* 
Aliso 
Canyon* 
S
ta
te
 a
n
d
 F
ed
er
al
 R
eg
u
la
to
ry
 A
g
en
ci
es
 
Negotiations 
with subject  
Conduct negotiations about long-term permitting  
Agree upon actions plans and/or contingent deals for 
emissions reductions 
x 
x 
 
x 
Commands 
and orders to 
subject  
Order company to conduct environmental testing 
Order company to host public meetings 
Order company to reduce emissions 
Order payment of fines and/or reimbursements 
Order company to suspend operations 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Changing 
rules  
Change regulatory rules, e.g. reduce permissible emissions  
Create new oversight and/or advisory bodies within 
agency 
x 
x 
 
Engaging 
other policy 
entities 
Involve higher power structures, e.g. Gov. Brown 
Create new oversight and/or advisory bodies between 
agencies 
o 
x 
x 
 
Legal actions File legal petition for permanent closure  
File legal petition for reimbursements 
Conduct criminal investigation 
x 
x 
x 
 
x 
x 
Engaging 
with public 
Choose whether or not to publicly disclose information  
Host or participate in public meetings 
Create internal task forces for community engagement 
Offer free health testing and/or screenings 
Conduct air monitoring beyond routine sampling 
Offer indirectly related programs to benefit public (e.g. job  
training for environmental consultants) 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
 
x 
x 
S
ta
te
 
L
eg
is
la
tu
re
 
Publicity 
 
Give public speeches and visits to sites  
Write open letters to other governmental entities 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Lawmaking Pass new laws revising or establishing jurisdiction, 
regulations, or regulatory bodies 
x x 
Funding Draft and edit state budget / introduce appropriations bills x  
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
th
e 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
Publicity Give public speeches, statements, and visits to sites o x 
Lawmaking Sign or veto laws 
Choose between importantly distinct bill options 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Oversight Oversee all regulatory agencies, which are part of 
Executive branch  
o o 
Executive 
orders 
Declare State of Emergency, with attendant funding and 
other resources 
 x 
Funding Draft and approve state budget x  
*Note: x = fully occurred; o = partially occurred 
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Table 5.2 California laws regarding Exide Technologies and Aliso Canyon 
Aliso Canyon 
Number 
(Author)  
Summary 
Intro. 
Date 
Status 
SB 380 
(Pavley)  
Imposes an immediate moratorium on further natural gas 
injection or production of gas from aging Aliso Canyon wells 
until a determination of no public risk, and CPUC must determine 
feasibility of decommissioning Aliso.  
2/24/15 Signed 
into law 
5/10/16 
SB 886 
(Pavley)  
Electricity: energy storage systems. The state must conduct an 
analysis of alternative by July 1, 2018 and those alternatives must 
be achieved by Dec 31, 2030. 
1/20/16 08/11/16 
Held in 
committee 
SB 887 
(Pavley)  
Adds new inspection, safety, and disclosure rules for all 14 
underground gas storage fields statewide, and increases safety 
standards of natural gas wells near schools and homes. Requires 
utilities to upgrade leak response and communications plans. 
Requires study of the long-term health impacts of community 
exposure to natural gas odorants.  
2/24/15 Signed 
into law 
9/26/16 
SB 888 
(Allen)  
OES will coordinate response to future natural gas leaks. 
Requires a penalty assessed against a gas corporation after a 
natural gas storage facility leak to at least equal the amount 
necessary to fully offset the GHG climate impact. Relevant 
penalty moneys to Gas Storage Facility Leak Mitigation Account. 
1/20/16 Signed 
into law 
9/23/16 
SB 1304 
(Huff, with 
De León, 
Pavley, 
Runner)  
Would authorize a county board of supervisors to provide for 
reassessment of property destroyed or damaged by a major 
misfortune or calamity, including environmental contamination, 
in an area or region subsequently proclaimed by the Governor to 
be in a state of emergency. Retroactively applies to Porter Ranch.  
2/19/16 Passed 
9/8/16; 
Vetoed 
9/26/16 
AB 2748 
(Gatto)  
Applies only to Aliso and Exide. Interim payment for an 
environmental disaster would not release polluter from liability 
for any related (future) claim. The statute of limitations for 
specified civil actions based upon exposure to a hazardous or 
toxic substance would increase from 2 to 3 years. 
2/19/16 Passed 
9/9/16; 
Vetoed 
9/26/16 
AB 1905 
(Wilk)  
The Natural Resources Agency, on or before July 1, 2017, must 
conduct an independent scientific study on natural gas injection 
and storage practices and facilities 
2/11/16 05/27/16 
Held in 
committee 
AB 1903 
(Wilk with 
Pavley)  
This bill would require [OEHHA] to conduct a study on the long-
term health impacts of the Aliso Canyon leak, paid for by 
SoCalGas. 
2/11/16 08/11/16 
Held in 
committee 
AB 1902 
(Wilk)  
This bill would set a 3 year statute of limitations for commencing 
a civil action based on exposure to hazardous or toxic substance 
resulting from Aliso Canyon gas leak (see SB 2748). 
2/11/16 04/05/16 
Held in 
committee 
Continued next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Exide Technologies 
Number 
(Author)  
Summary 
Intro. 
Date 
Status 
SB 2748 
(Gatto) 
See entry under Aliso Canyon, above.    
SB 673 
(Lara)  
Requires DTSC by January 1, 2018, to establish or update 
permitting criteria for hazardous waste facilities, and to develop 
and implement, by July 1, 2018, programmatic reforms “designed 
to improve the protectiveness, timeliness, legal defensibility, and 
enforceability of the department’s permitting program” 
2/27/15 Signed 
into law 
10/8/15 
SB 93  
(De León)  
AB 118 
(Santiago)  
Together, gives DTSC Account a loan of $176,600,000 for 
cleanup and investigation of lead-contaminated properties 
surrounding Exide, including job training activities, and actions 
taken to pursue all available remedies against potentially 
responsible parties.  
1/9/15 Signed 
into law 
4/20/16 
AB 1329 
(V. Manuel 
Pérez)  
Requires DTSC to prioritize enforcement actions affecting 
communities that have been identified by the California 
Environmental Protection Agency as being the most impacted 
environmental justice communities. 
2/22/13 Signed 
into law 
10/5/13 
AB 1330 
(John A. 
Pérez)  
Does same as AB 1329, and additionally facilitates public 
commentary for non-English speakers, raises cap for EJ Small 
Grant Program, would require CalEPA to maintain an agency-
wide public database of certain information related to entities 
regulated by each board, department, and office of the agency. 
Many other provisions were excised in process.  
2/22/13 Stalled  
as of 
11/30/14 
 
 
In the introduction of this thesis, I outlined four ways in which the results of this study of 
industrial health crises can inform our collective approach to understanding focusing events and 
their role in the policy process: recognizing the unique characteristics of industrial crises; 
looking at smaller scales of events and policy change; acknowledging the significant role of 
community organizing and public engagement in bringing policy change to fruition; and 
including a focus on justice. I argue that the patterns that arise from Exide and Aliso, both in the 
characteristics of the communities and facilities, as well as the regulatory responses to their 
crises, shed new light on the concept of focusing events and add nuance and deeper 
understanding the work of Kingdon, Birkland, and others.  
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Unique characteristics of industrial health crises 
In prior literature on focusing events, the focus has been on clear-cut disasters, such as 
earthquakes and terrorist attacks, that are easily identified as focusing events. Most stakeholders 
can agree that they are disasters, which is not the case in industrial crises. There are two main 
threads that set industrial events apart from other crises in terms of their functionality as focusing 
events. The first is the human creation of risk and the unique impact on public health compared 
to other focusing events, and the second is the contestation in evaluating and responding to the 
hazard.  
Human creation of risk 
Industrial health crises are often characterized by a creeping risk that is less attention-
grabbing than earthquakes or explosions, and thus can be harder to discover or turn into impetus 
for change. In the two case studies, and likely in many other cases, there is a degree of awareness 
of risk – smells from the facility, small accidents or leaks, existing regulatory actions – but little 
to no idea of the scope of the risk. Exide racked up numerous violations, not all related to lead, 
over the years, while a recent testimony in front of the State Senate revealed numerous small 
issues and evidence of deteriorating infrastructure at Aliso (Baker, 2014). The fact that warnings 
are ignored is intrinsic to the existence of the hazard. Aliso Canyon, while started by a single 
well “blowout,” became a much more significant concern because of the accumulated risks and 
suffering entailed by the extent of the leak. Likewise, a single small lead or arsenic release is of 
minor concern; the reason Exide ever became a focusing event was because of the accumulated 
risk of years of illegally high emissions. In most industrial health crises, there may be a single 
focusing event that illustrates this risk, but the hazard exists and is worsened because of its 
longevity. This is integral to its role in policy change. 
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The dismissal of warning signs is not unique to industrial health crises. In the years 
leading up to Hurricane Katrina, a classic focusing event, there were numerous warnings about 
the frail, inadequate state of the levees protecting New Orleans. When the hurricane hit, it was 
the failure of the levees, rather than the strength of the storm itself, that caused its extreme and 
unequal impact (Hartman, 2006). However, this fact has thus far been mostly overlooked in 
literature about focusing events, and industrial health crises are particularly appropriate for 
illustrating its importance.  
That being said, the warning signs in industrial events may be less apparent than other 
situations. Although the technology in industrial events is usually less complicated and more 
easily altered to address concerns than, for example, a nuclear power station, it is also less tightly 
regulated. Therefore, risks are often not identified as such until too late, or improvements are 
deferred due to the cost or hassle. In both Exide and Aliso, there was knowledge of a risk, 
whether from the inevitable aging wells at Aliso or from the ongoing issues with ineffective 
emissions control at Exide, but changes were put off until it was too late, and significant and 
sadly avoidable health impacts occurred. Pulido, Kohl, and Cotton write that Exide was “a 
spectacular case of inability/unwillingness to enforce the law” (2016, p.13) – the laws were in 
place, but they were unused. This raises two important points about the policy response to 
industrial health issues. The first is the consistent failure to identify or pursue violations in 
existing regulations, and the second is the inherent ineffectiveness of current enforcement 
mechanisms.  
The first issue is the failure of regulatory agencies to identify or pursue violations. There 
are laws in place that regulate the chemicals of concern that Exide emitted, but emissions still 
almost routinely exceeded these regulations. This improper execution of laws and regulations 
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that are already in place is a complete failure of the company, of course, but of the agency as 
well. In a public forum at Pitzer College on Oct. 6, 2016, Senator De León stated that DTSC had 
suffered from corruption, laziness, and an inability to enforce existing laws adequately. While 
this may have been overstated for political reasons, there is no doubt that Exide and many other 
facilities are able to operate with a degree of disregard for environmental law. Many involved in 
the Exide case have angrily proclaimed that the facility was operating on an interim permit for 
decades, and for the first many months after the HRA report came out, DTSC was primarily 
trying to regularize Exide’s basic permit. In these situations, it is not necessarily a policy change 
that needs to occur, but rather better enforcement of existing laws. In many cases, regulatory 
agencies lack the human-power, money, and equipment to continually monitor every facility and 
ensure complete compliance, so this is one soft approach to improving outcomes that does not 
require changing laws, but rather changing funding. That being said, in some cases this may be 
as difficult, if not more so, as changing laws themselves. 
 Even when regulatory agencies do identify and pursue punishment for violations, for 
many companies, this is a slap on the wrist rather than a motivation for systemic change. The 
cost of updating pollution controls can be tremendous, and fines are often on the order of a few 
thousand dollars, so companies often simply pay the fines and do little to improve emissions. 
The LA Times  (Barboza, 2014) quoted Msgr. John Moretta of Resurrection Catholic Church of 
Boyle Heights, which was highly active in anti-Exide organizing, in response to the federal 
criminal investigation: 
Hopefully, this is another way to bring Exide to accountability… You have a company 
that has a whole list of violations and, year after year, they pay a fine and they are 
allowed to continue working.  
Msgr. Moretta’s statement illustrates the frustration of local residents with the regulatory 
process, which in their view essentially allows companies to pay to pollute.  
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Contestation  
The second important aspect of industrial health crises is the degree to which they are 
contested, from their very existence to how to move forward. I revisit the concept of consensus 
and dissensus crises (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). In the former, everyone agrees on the 
existence of the crisis, appropriate norms and values, and general directions for solutions, 
whereas in the latter there are contrasting views on the nature, origin, and appropriate response to 
a situation.  Given the inherently fluid and contested nature of industrial contamination, from 
quantifying pollution and associated risks, to epidemiologically supporting impacts, to assigning 
responsibility and determining the appropriate response, they manifest as dissensus crises. 
However, characteristics of consensus versus dissensus crises are partially dependent on scale. 
For example, while climate change is an international consensus crisis among scientists and 
international leaders, in the US political sphere, it has aspects of a conflict crisis, as a stubborn 
minority refuses to agree that it is anthropogenic or even that it exists at all, let alone agree on 
appropriate responses. In California at least, the unjust patterns of industrial pollution is a 
consensus crisis; many laws and policies have been enacted to address the general existence of 
environmental injustice. But each individual case is a conflict crisis, in which the particular risks 
and impacts are hotly contested by the affected community, epidemiologists, companies, 
government agencies, and other interested parties.  
The most fundamental contestation in industrial health crises is identifying the existence, 
extent and severity of health impacts. There was significant evidence throughout both case 
studies of disagreements over impacts, often between companies trying to mitigate public fear 
and their own liability, and residents concerned about their homes and families. As I detailed in 
the introduction, this is a common aspect of such crises (Brown et al., 2012; Lerner, 2010). In 
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addition to overt impacts such as bloody noses and elevated blood lead levels, residents may also 
suffer psychosocial impacts (Bertazzi, 1989) that are nearly impossible to “scientifically” prove. 
These disagreements are also not just based on the opposing interests of the parties, but 
also accessibility of information about the situation and ability to interpret it (see p. 79). 
Governmental agencies usually fall somewhere in-between, beholden to some degree of political 
considerations while also trying to protect public health and the environment. The following 
three subsections address three other ways in which industrial health crises may be contested, 
often rooted in the competing interests of the stakeholders: economic concerns, sustainability and 
“greenwashing,” and long term visions for solving the crisis.  
 Economic considerations and the prospect of job creation may tip the scales in a 
community to favor the construction or expansion of a potentially hazardous industrial site. 
Industry developers often claim that their facilities provide solid, blue-collar jobs and other, 
generally unspecified “economic benefits” to working-class communities, a positive aspect of 
industrial activity. But this economic value comes at a cost, especially when workers are exposed 
to hazards within the workplace. In Aliso Canyon, workers attempting to close the leak were 
primarily exposed to elevated levels of natural gas, mercaptans, and associated hydrocarbons 
including potentially benzene, as well as risks of explosion from the efforts to seal the leak. In 
Exide, the original Health Risk Assessment report indicated cancer risks for on-site workers of 
440 cases in a million.  
The jobs are also used as leverage when communities organize to clean up or shut down a 
facility, because if the facility goes away, so do the jobs. A previous study on the aftermath of 
the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico found that residents in counties that 
were highly dependent on the offshore drilling industry had a more pro-drilling attitude after the 
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spill, although not before (Bishop, 2014). The event itself highlighted the economic importance 
of the risky activity. In Southeast LA, Exide workers worried about losing their jobs spoke at 
community meetings in favor of the company, as quoted in the LA Times (Garrison, 2013): 
‘Stop trying to destroy our family,’ one worker's wife, Sandra Gutierrez, told the crowd. 
‘Let's stop trying to blame everything on Exide.’  
In fact, over 120 workers were laid off from the facility when it closed in March 2015. They 
much preferred improved pollution controls rather than complete closure, while other residents 
who were not economically dependent favored closure. Some SoCalGas employees do live in 
Porter Ranch, but there has been less evidence on their experiences (SoCalGas, 2016).  
The second broad area of contestation relates to environmental concerns and the use of 
environmental rhetoric and framing to shift the debate. Pellow (1998) writes about about some of 
these dynamics in the context of municipal recycling facilities. The rich irony of Exide’s 
function as a lead battery recycler is a perfect illustration of the complexity of many 
environmental issues. Exide collects used batteries, otherwise destined for a toxic waste site, and 
regenerates something useful from them. It reduces the amount of new material that has to be 
mined, and manufactures batteries that are integral to the reliability of renewable power sources 
like solar and wind. Exide officials took advantage of these facts, and used sustainability rhetoric 
to support their point of view, including stating that closure of the facility was a loss of “green” 
jobs (Kim, 2014). While they are not wrong, per se, such “greenwashing” ignores the nuance in 
environmental safety and steps around their irresponsible behavior regarding emissions, as well 
as worker safety within those jobs. 
 Although it affected Aliso Canyon in a totally different way, sustainability and 
environmental concerns also influenced the response to events there. The gas leak had threefold 
impact: immediate health impacts on residents in the area; meso-term concerns about energy 
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security in the Los Angeles area; and long term implications for state and national greenhouse 
gas emissions. While the important synchronicity between the three concerns will be covered in 
a later section, with regard to sustainability, natural gas is often touted as a cleaner, “greener” 
alternative to other fossil fuels. Especially with the boom in fracking, natural gas is becoming 
increasingly common as a cheap, greenwashed source of energy.  
 The final area of contestation seen in these two case studies was over the future of the 
facility. The long term plans of the stakeholders involved in industrial crises are often in stark 
opposition: The companies that operate the facility wish to get them reopened as quickly as 
possible, while residents often want complete shutdown. The two topics above, sustainability and 
jobs, may be used as wedges on either side of this debate. Aliso had a third wedge, so to speak, 
the threat to Los Angeles’s energy security in the event of continued closure during the hot 
summer. Residents felt that that SoCalGas and regulatory agencies were engaging in “blackout 
blackmail,” threatening that the closure of the facility would cause widespread power outages in 
the peak of summer in LA. So residents found independent analyses and reports that they felt 
demonstrated the complete opposite: that LA did not even need the storage facility (observed in 
public rally and protest march, Oct. 23, 2016). I have not been able to independently verify the 
veracity of either side’s position, but it illustrates the way the same issue can be viewed and 
described very differently by groups with different perspectives and agendas. 
 In short, both the anthropogenic development of the crisis and in its degree of 
contestation set industrial health events apart from other focusing events in existing literature. It 
suggests that future work on focusing events should take into account the inherently subjective 
nature of defining and addressing crises, and that policy outcomes may sometimes be most 
impactful by simply holding current structures to higher account. 
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Scale of events 
The existing literature has focused on the federal level of problem and response. But 
there are a few issues with this approach. The first is that industrial health crises are nearly 
always on the surface a local problem, with a commensurately scaled response. I write “on the 
surface” with intention: Kurtz (2003) points out that scaling is another contested area in such 
issues, where the inherent spatial ambiguity can lead to broadening or narrowing of the scale of 
the issue, to include or exclude wider social and geographic patterns. Environmental justice 
activists and scholars have rejected narrowing and strictly localizing of these issues, rightly 
pointing out that they are part of larger institutions and power structures (Kurtz, 2003). An 
inherent conflict exists in this balance, because as I have written, the origins and solutions to 
such problems cannot be understood outside the specific context of the communities in which 
they exist. Kurtz writes, “The significance of scale is expressed alternatively…as an analytical 
spatial category, as scales of regulation, as territorial framework(s) for cultural legitimacy, and as 
a means of inclusion, exclusion and legitimation” (p. 887). In many industrial health events, the 
appropriate scale acknowledges and engages with the issues of inclusion, legitimacy, and wider 
social patterns, while focusing on the salient characteristics of the local. In these two case studies 
in particular, scale is expressed as a spatial category, to understand unique aspects of the affected 
communities and their particular vulnerabilities, and through scales of regulation, to understand 
how the crises took place and the mechanisms of response.  
With that in mind, the fact that most literature has looked at focusing events at the federal 
scale ignores communities’ experiences. In writing about community vulnerability in the face of 
climate change, Parkins and MacKendrick (2007) point out that, much like the literature on 
focusing events, the literature on the impacts of climate change is focused on large, short-term, 
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extreme events like hurricanes and floods. However, climate change, like industrial health crises, 
has impacts at a slower pace and on much smaller scales. It is at these scales that vulnerability 
must be assessed, linking community conditions to specific policy recommendations and actions, 
because vulnerability to such events is intrinsic to a community (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; 
Parkins & MacKendrick, 2007), as illustrated through the narratives of these two case studies.  
The other reason is that individual affected communities have the greatest leverage at the 
city or county level, particularly in a highly populous state like California, because they have 
better access to local or, to a lesser degree, state representatives, as opposed to national 
representatives. Furthermore, although the federal government has more funding, it often has less 
dexterity and speed in its responses, because it is constrained by the Constitutional restrictions on 
federal jurisdiction, less familiarity with the particulars of a given situation, and a crushing load 
of issues to address.  
That being said, the pace of change is very slow at every level, from local regulatory 
agencies to state legislature. In Exide’s case, DTSC took months to establish the blood testing 
program and even longer to actually start blood testing, and they took months to get results on 
residential lead testing despite using an instrument which “instantaneously” reads lead content in 
soil. Even at the local level, where accountability should be higher, agencies take an 
exhaustingly long time to get anything done. Part of this is, in a sense, necessary: as the cleanup 
process began, residents debated whether to apply for a waiver for the usually required 
Environmental Impact Report (EIR), in order to start cleanup as soon as possible. But many were 
concerned that without proper planning and consideration, the cleaning would worsen the 
existing situation and cause new problems. So it was decided to go ahead with the EIR, leaving 
many residents bitter and upset that they are living in extremely contaminated homes.  
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In the state legislature, it takes months to pass laws, if they are passed at all. Many bills 
are introduced but languish as other issues take precedence. In response to Exide, at least seven 
bills were introduced, and four ultimately became law. In response to Aliso, at least nine bills 
were introduced, and three ultimately became law. Many fell by the wayside in various 
committees, and in both cases, at least one was vetoed by the Governor.   
Furthermore, while the policy response at the local level may be strong and address the 
individual problem, for example, the final closure of Exide’s facility in Vernon, the inherently 
local nature of the issue often prevents the more comprehensive reform that many EJ activists 
would prefer. In fact, a pattern in the two case studies was that policy makers, in particular non-
agency actors, chose smaller-scope solutions rather than enacting more substantive changes. In 
response to Exide, in 2014 the California Senate and Assembly passed two bills, SB 712 and SB 
812. Both would have regularized Exide’s permit situation, but the former had specific 
requirements that meant it effectively applied to only Exide, while the latter had substantive 
changes in the permitting process that would have affected Exide among other facilities, and 
included a requirement for permit renewal every five years. When the two came before Governor 
Brown, he signed the more narrowly targeted SB 712. In another case, Rep. Gatto introduced AB 
2748 in February 2016, which would have provided certain forms of relief including an extended 
statute of limitations and affirmation of corporate liability for specifically people affected by 
Aliso Canyon and Exide. Although it was vetoed by Gov. Brown, it similarly illustrates the 
tendency to target changes to the specific case at hand rather than preparing for future situations.  
The exception to this pattern is cases in which communities can effectively broaden the 
scope of their issue to include other campaigns and/or communities, as with Porter Ranch, which 
provides them leverage for a greater scope of change. A number of local initiatives and state 
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legislative bills have been implemented in response to Aliso Canyon. Some were specific to 
Aliso Canyon, like the legislative moratorium on injections (SB 380), ongoing as of November 
2016. Another is SB 887, which requires new inspections and safety standards for underground 
gas storage. Many storage facilities are remote from populated areas, so the bill primarily affects 
the risks of further greenhouse gas emissions rather than public health implications. In fact, of 
the three bills passed in the wake of Aliso Canyon, all three reference or are entirely focused on 
GHG emissions reductions and mitigation, and two bills that the Governor vetoed, despite 
support from the State House and Senate, related more to public health and Aliso Canyon 
specifically. This idea of linked issues and the effect of community organizing in response to the 
crisis bring us to the next key finding from the two case studies, community engagement. 
 
Community activism 
The importance of community organizing in changing the outcomes of these two cases 
cannot be overstated. As illustrated throughout the case studies, organizing plays a tremendous 
role in keeping issues in the news, in policymakers’ minds, and on track to positive progress.   
The first influence is in simply putting and keeping an issue on the agenda. In all stages, 
community organizing holds agencies and elected officials accountable to constituents’ needs. 
Much of this comes at the agency level, such as changes in agency rules or priorities, rather than 
changes in underlying laws. For example, the Exide Advisory Group was convened at least in 
part to be able to gather feedback and opinions from community members, a responsibility that 
DTSC is taking very seriously (personal communication, Cesar Campos, Public Participation 
Supervisor for DTSC). This is a physical space in which agency representatives and community 
members can confront the challenges of the cleanup process, and residents do confront. At an 
Chittick • 79 
 
Oct. 20 meeting, many spoke angrily about their experiences and one brought up the evacuation 
in Porter Ranch as a point of contrast. Thus, organizing keeps agencies aware and responsive to 
communities. Of course, that does not mean that the funding, pace, and thoroughness of agency 
efforts and actions were not always adequate. Nonetheless, community organizing pushes issues 
onto the agenda and can successfully move beyond that to policy change.   
The second influence of community organizing relates to the ultimate changes that occur: 
the demands of communities become policy alternatives.  For example, although policy makers 
would likely never have planned to close Aliso Canyon, Porter Ranch residents have joined with 
anti-fossil fuel activists from around LA and the country, and have an ongoing campaign to 
#shutitALLdown. Their desires have added an entirely new option to the suite of responses to the 
leak, and their continued activism pushes policy makers to seriously consider it.  In fact, 
regardless of where the communities started from, both Porter Ranch and Southeast LA were 
successful in demanding temporary closure of the facilities and cleanup of nearby homes. Exide 
was permanently shut down, while the ultimate fate of Aliso Canyon is still uncertain.  
The third way in which community activism was critical to amplifying the effects of the 
core focusing event was in linking multiple issues together. Particularly in Aliso Canyon, 
connecting issues was a key component to building support and pressure for change. For Aliso, 
the implications for public health, local fuel supplies, and greenhouse gas emissions pulled three 
entirely different groups into the dialogue. Porter Ranch had a far shorter history of organizing 
than Southeast LA, but SPR’s pre-existing partnership with Food and Water Watch, in part an 
anti-fracking organization, was integral to post-leak organizing, uniting affected residents who 
had previously not been involved, and the anti-oil and gas and climate change activist 
communities. Local activists connected the leak in their neighborhood to the larger public health 
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issues of fossil fuel extraction and use; to activism in other areas of LA, the state, and as far 
away as New York (Steingraber, 2016); to the anti-fracking movement; to the larger issues of 
climate change and a sustainable future and to the need for “green” jobs like solar. In protests I 
observed, connecting individual health to the health and longevity of the planet was a key part of 
their rhetoric and a rallying cry. The environmental component did not at all overshadow the 
public and individual health concerns of residents, but rather helped bolster the communities’ 
demands for a complete shutdown, and helped widen the concerned public from just nearby 
residents to activists all over the greater LA area and the country who could sympathize with the 
message of “dirty oil.”  
A recent story from rural Alabama highlights the importance of linking issues as well as 
the role of community vulnerability in eliciting a policy response: Eight Mile, a small town with 
predominantly black, low-income residents, suffered a 500 pound leak of mercaptans after an 
underground pipeline was hit by lighting. Mercaptans are the odorous chemical blamed for 
symptoms at Aliso, but residents in Eight Mile have not been moved, tested, treated, or 
compensated, despite myriad medical symptoms (Penn, 2016). Ironically – or perhaps not – the 
facility was purchased by the same company as SoCalGas, Sempra Energy, shortly after the leak 
took place. Carletta Davis, a resident of Eight Mile, stated: “Because we don’t have the financial 
wherewithal to put pressure on these people, they simply turn their heads,” (Penn, 2016). Beyond 
the financial wherewithal, the residents also do not have the same kind of organizing appeal for 
people that are invested in phasing out fossil fuel use, because the leak was not directly tied to a 
fossil-fuel facility. Of course, the stored mercaptans were likely intended to odorize natural gas, 
but in some ways it is less appealing to protest the middlemen than the face of the operation.    
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The final form of influence of community organizing was synchronicity of events. While 
the tripartite impacts in Aliso Canyon (public health, greenhouse gas emissions, and regional 
energy security) helped fuel its success in building a wide base of support and eliciting 
governmental responses, this was based on synchronicity of goals between related organizations. 
Protests in Porter Ranch were also fueled by other, unfortunately timed events in the Aliso 
Canyon facility, including small fires which added credibility to claims of its inherent hazards.  
More powerful was the synchronicity between Aliso and Exide. The prompt, strong 
response to Aliso Canyon helped provide leverage for Southeast LA residents to push for the 
same in their area. Many saw the Governor’s visit to Porter Ranch two months after the leak 
began, when as of three and a half years later he has not visited Vernon, as a powerful symbol of 
inequality between the two events and their differential treatments. Kingdon (1992) writes that 
any mechanisms by which problems enter the policy agenda, including focusing events, can be 
heightened or subdued by political considerations and attention from the “visible” cohort of 
policy participants, such as politicians, high-level administrators, and the media. Indeed, the 
media (see p. 84 for more on the media) used the comparison between Exide and Porter Ranch 
many times (LA Times Editorial Staff, 2016a; Martinez, 2016), and given that many of the same 
agencies are involved in both, such synchronicity places a unique pressure and accountability on 
all involved parties.  
 
Incorporating social justice 
The entirety of these case studies illustrate the importance of considering social justice in 
understanding the influence of focusing events. Industrial health crises occur most often in low-
income communities of color, and the outcomes are dependent on what communities are affected 
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and the resources they can leverage to push for change. Those most affected are often the least 
able to take advantage of the opportunity presented by a potential focusing event, as they are 
politically, socially, and economically marginalized. They are not seen as important political 
constituents, even if they do express concern, which dramatically affects their ability to act as a 
concerned public and put pressure on public officials to act. These factors suggest the necessity 
of taking larger structural issues in society into account.  
Incorporating concepts of environmental and social justice into the theory of focusing 
events is clearly important to better understand the processes of policy change. In practice, this is 
somewhat nebulous; the approach I take is to incorporate the relative power and social 
positionalities of stakeholders in each case study – and here, the temporal and geographical 
closeness between the two cases – into the process of analysis. In the following subsections, I 
explore six facets of EJ that arose from these two specific cases: barriers to understanding and 
knowledge risk, institutional trust and agency complicity, municipal divisions and 
unincorporated areas, corporate bankruptcy, media coverage, and white privilege. The first three 
facets relate to the creation of an industrial health crisis, the next two relate to the outcomes of a 
focusing event, and the final one bridges both. Some of these facets have been identified as 
contributors to community activism (Lubell, Vedlitz, Zahran, & Alston, 2006), and many have 
long been identified in environmental justice literature, as detailed in each section. Thus I focus 
on ways in which they can contribute to an improved understanding of focusing events.   
Barriers to understanding and knowledge risk 
The literature amply demonstrates the role of the social construction of risk in responses 
to environmental contamination (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2001; Brown et al., 2012; Elliott et al., 
1999). Different facilities have differently socially understood risks, influenced by multiple 
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layers of community characteristics. Firstly, some facilities are inherently viewed as more 
dangerous regardless of the actual risks involved. For example, facilities that produce strong 
smells, smoke, or other perceivable indicators of emissions may be considered more dangerous 
(Wakefield et al., 2001).  
Second is the ability to understand information about a risk. Both communities are home 
to many immigrants, which can pose a fundamental challenge from language barriers. The 
proportion of immigrants is higher in Southeast LA, where the non-English language spoken is 
almost uniformly Spanish. DTSC and other agencies made a concerted effort to provide 
translations of all written materials and live translations during meetings, which is a step in the 
right direction. Nonetheless, in both case studies, the nature of the issues invited the use of 
technical language that is very difficult for non-experts to understand and engage with. This is 
more important in Southeast LA, where educational attainment is lower.  
Furthermore, when it comes to the highly technical jargon used in many industrial health 
crises, even people with high educational attainment may be at a loss. This language does serve a 
purpose for those who can understand it, but it also alienates and excludes many other 
stakeholders. Brown et al. (2012) write of the “scientization” of decision-making processes, in 
which quantitative, “objective” information is prioritized over the experiences of affected 
individuals. One Porter Ranch resident said, “If we don’t have facts, we’re just emotional” 
(personal observations, One Year Later protest). While facts may appear to provide an objective 
perspective on risks and appropriate responses, it also means that “debates regarding the costs, 
benefits, and potential health and societal risks of new technologies and industrial production 
may be dominated by experts…and divorced from their socioeconomic and political contexts” 
(Brown et al., 2012).  
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These processes can be seen in both Aliso and Exide. For example, while SoCalGas 
reported that there would be no long-term health effects from the gas leak, many residents felt 
that they had been irrevocably affected physically and emotionally. However, it would be 
functionally impossible for them to generate scientifically rigorous epidemiological evidence to 
support their experiences, because there were too few people affected and there is not enough 
existing literature on the impacts of an event such as the Aliso Canyon leak. In a similar way, 
blood lead tests were provided for residents near Exide in Vernon, but these tests only show lead 
exposure in the past six months – not years of living near a facility that may have routinely been 
emitting illegal quantities of the toxic chemical. These questions are both difficult to evaluate 
scientifically, and provide barriers to residents’ claims of impacts. For those reasons, among 
other complex and specific reasons, though, both communities remained relatively unaware of 
the potential hazards they were facing, and thus, more vulnerable to contamination and to the 
single revelation that is characteristic of focusing events.  
Institutional trust and agency complicity 
The degree of trust in institutions – both government and business – can affect how the 
public experiences risks and responds to industrial health issues (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1993; 
Hudson, 2006; Metlay, 1999). Given the lack of trust in DTSC, residents in Southeast LA were 
more likely to immediately respond to any evidence of a danger, because they had little faith that 
DTSC would address it or perhaps even accurately represent it. On the flip side, this suggests 
that crises like Aliso, where the facility was generally perceived as safe if thought about at all, 
are more surprising and therefore more effective as focusing events. In both cases, residents felt 
that they were not getting complete or honest answers about what was happening, and this likely 
gradually eroded their trust in the capacity of the government to appropriately take care of the 
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crisis. It may have spurred residents to deepen their own involvement. While outside the scope of 
this thesis, further qualitative research would elucidate how trust in regulatory agencies to take 
care of potential risks can contribute to the creation of industrial health crises.  
Regarding outcomes, evidence from after the focusing events, at least in Exide’s, 
suggests that institutional trust can have a significant impact. When Gov. Brown approved 
$176.6 million in funding for the cleanup, he suggested exempting the funds from the normal 
CEQA environmental review process (see p. 41). Although there was debate within the 
community, the fear that DTSC would fail to do a safe, adequate job without an agreed and 
approved plan ultimately meant that the cleanup process was not exempted (LA Times Editorial 
Staff, 2016b). This means that residents have to wait until the CEQA process is finished, 
estimated at mid-2017 to get their homes cleaned. This includes residents who are living in 
literally toxic dirt.  
This vignette and the idea of institutional trust also brings up the idea of agency 
complicity. In the case of Exide, I already wrote about the ways in which agency decisions, 
whether intentionally or not, precluded residents from obtaining resources or outcomes that they 
needed and desired. Regulatory bodies must balance a tremendous number of considerations, 
often with directly opposing implications. But they are the ones that levy fines, that decide where 
to pursue violations, that decided whether or not to allow criminal cases to be filed. Criminal 
charges against Exide are now prohibited, while they have already been filed against SoCalGas 
(St. John & Walton, 2016). Higher state authorities have chosen to not prosecute agency 
employees. The role of the companies themselves in influencing agency and higher-level 
decisions – often referred to as agency capture by corporate interests (Singleton, 2000) – is 
opaque, but this possibility hints at agencies diverted from their intended purpose, a betrayal of 
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the trust that residents may (or eventually may not) have placed in them to protect their health 
and wellbeing. Thus, understanding both community trust in institutions and the ways in which 
agencies are complicit, intentionally or not, with environmental harm, are crucial to unpacking 
community demands and ultimately, the policy choices that are made in response to industrial 
health crises. 
Municipal divisions and unincorporated areas 
Heaney et al. (2011) write that “low-income communities of color straddling rural-urban 
unincorporated boundaries of municipalities across the U.S. often fall within extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, joint-planning agreement, or industrial zoning designations that tend to concentrate 
locally unwanted land uses and psychosocial stressors  and  limit  access  to  health-promoting 
infrastructure.” While not exactly the case with Southeast LA, which is a mix of unincorporated, 
small city, and City of Los Angeles itself, the same pattern holds because of Vernon’s separate 
incorporation. Vernon has nearly unique autonomy to tax and regulate – or not – the facilities 
within its borders. It has its own funding and close to no public accountability, as residents that 
live literally across the street but not technically residents have no standing with the Vernon 
government. This is exacerbated by the fact that residents in all three incorporation statuses are 
mostly low-income people of color, and that their city (or county) governments do not have the 
capacity to pursue action. Those within LA may be able to vote for City Council, but face a city 
government preoccupied with hundreds of other issues and millions of other residents. Those in 
unincorporated areas have the least influence, as they cannot even draw on the resources of a 
specific city, but rather have to plead to the county.  
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Corporate bankruptcy  
A long, unfortunate tradition in environmental cases is the closure of companies 
responsible for environmental damage before they can be held liable for cleanup (Plater et al., 
2016). If the original company is dissolved or enters bankruptcy, the individual stockholders, 
executives, and contractors can walk away with massive profits, while the technically 
responsible entity no longer exists for residents to sue or obtain reparations. On the other hand, 
the purpose of bankruptcy negotiations is to allow the company to continue to be viable, an 
outcome that facilitates ongoing financial liability for such companies. A few months after 
information about Exide’s Vernon facility started emerging, Exide Technologies Inc. declared 
bankruptcy, stated to be unrelated to the Vernon plant (Cornell, 2013). It was not for the first 
time Exide had declared bankruptcy. Regardless of the reasons for doing so, the importance of 
corporate bankruptcy proceedings is in its impact on the policy outcomes of industrial health 
events. Bankruptcy negotiations added an additional layer of complexity to all regulatory actions 
and legal suits, including the attempts of regulators to obtain funds settled upon in a previous 
agreement ($38.6 million for closure and cleanup of the facility, and $9 million for the cleanup 
of nearby homes (Barboza, 2015a)). 
Media coverage 
Media coverage can play a tremendous role in the outcomes of public issues, and its role 
in the policy process has been amply explored elsewhere (Birkland & Lawrence, 2009; Cook et 
al., 1983; Holder & Treno, 1997; Shanahan et al., 2008). In general, the patterns in media 
coverage noted throughout Chapters 3 and 4 align with current theory on the impact of media 
coverage on policy change, including its ability to amplify attention for an issue and its critical 
role in how issues are framed, and thus it will not be discussed in much depth here. I wish only to 
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note that, in these cases, both received extensive local news coverage from small news 
organizations, local public radio, and the LA Times; Aliso received notable national news 
coverage. The comparisons between the two events, which point out disparities in responses, 
were particularly potent and are characteristic of media’s desire for “conflict and competition” 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). The imperative to sell news prompts a need for new stories 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), so the ongoing nature of events related to Aliso and Exide 
actually benefitted Porter Ranch and Southeast LA. The continuous twists on the story and new 
updates to be reported. These two aspects of media coverage relate directly to the role of 
industrial health crises as focusing events.  
White privilege 
 Before concluding this section on justice, I must re-engage with Pulido’s (2000) work on 
white privilege and environmental racism. The genesis of this thesis was the comparison between 
the responses to Exide and Aliso Canyon, many of which focused on the demographics of the 
two communities and the much more rapid, resourced response to the latter crisis. Although 
Porter Ranch has a significant Asian population (27%), its population is predominantly white, in 
contrast to the less than 5% white population affected by Vernon. White privilege in visible in 
multiple layers of these stories.  
 The first is one Pulido focuses on, housing access and residential segregation. Southeast 
LA’s histories, a little different for each small town in the area, nonetheless illustrate processes 
of “minority move-in” and white flight. It is a densely, densely populated urban core with 
massive industrial infrastructure. Some of its towns started as white-only and slowly became 
predominantly people of color, like Huntington Park, whereas others started more diverse and 
slowly lost their white residents, like Boyle Heights and East LA. These white residents moved 
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to places like Porter Ranch, where the median home price is nearly twice the median home price 
in Boyle Heights ($731,600 versus $390,500). In the one year anniversary protest, residents of 
Porter Ranch lamented the fact that they had moved to Porter Ranch to get away from the hustle 
and bustle of the city, the industry and the smog (personal observations), fitting Pulido’s 
commentary on well-to-do whites buying the privilege of a cleaner environment. Residents in 
Southeast LA constantly face poor air quality and strong smells, which although not exactly the 
same are nonetheless analogous to the air quality issues in Porter Ranch, and in addition they 
face contamination from a known neurotoxin that affects childhood development, with lifelong 
effects. Only this second one has received significant policy attention, despite the inherent 
wrongness of the first as well. 
 The fact of the matter is that no community should be subjected to any kind of industrial 
health crisis. Both of these cases resulted from negligence, perhaps even gross negligence, on the 
parts of the companies and agencies that were involved in managing the facilities, and both were 
preventable. Every human has the right to a clean, safe environment in which to live, work, and 
play, and the issues of disproportionate access and exposure extend far beyond these two case 
studies, beyond even industrial emissions and contamination, to the very spatiality of American 
cities. Sources of pollution and environmental harms still exist, residential segregation still 
exists, white privilege still exists, and so injustice still exists. All scales of government use the 
rhetoric of environmental justice without actually achieving it, because the vast majority of the 
time, responses to crises like Exide and Aliso ignore the history and larger social patterns that led 
to them in the first place. This is the final lesson of including justice in analyses of focusing 
events. There is no way to understand focusing events outside the context that creates them, 
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especially in the case of industrial health crises. Thus linking local situations and outcomes to 
broader patterns adds another crucial layer to our understanding of focusing events.  
 
Concluding comments 
Industrial health crises act as modulated focusing events, in which a brewing public-
health issue is discovered nearly simultaneously by policy makers and the public, highlighting 
deeply-rooted issues with existing policy such as fundamentally inadequate regulation or 
enforcement. These events often do not end without significant intervention from public agencies 
and community movements to pressure policy makers and responsible parties. Even then, the 
effects may linger on, like lead in the soil. The four factors that arise from this study – the 
uniqueness of industrial crises, the scale of analysis, the role of community activism, and a focus 
on justice – add nuance to the scholarly understanding of focusing events and provide a starting 
point for further research into the processes of policy change. They do not just reflect how 
industrial health crises can act as focusing events to catalyze policy change; they reflect patterns 
in other aspects of the policy process, from all types of focusing events, to problem identification 
and agenda setting, to institutional learning, and countless other areas of public policy.  
I selected the two case studies in this thesis for the many parallels and contrasts that they 
have, and the unique ideas that can be drawn out of such a comparison. However, there are, 
sadly, numerous other industrial health crises that would add greatly to this analysis. An 
infamous one from just the past few years is the Flint, Michigan water crisis, in which changes in 
the city water supply and gross negligence by city and state officials led to extensive, devastating 
lead contamination in the municipal water supplies. Although the contamination was hinted at as 
early as April 2014 and became national news in March 2015 (Robbins, 2016), as of December 
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2016, many residents still do not have potable water. This case study even more clearly 
illustrates the importance of governmental and political accountability and agencies’ complicity 
in the propagation of environmental harms. The scope of this thesis did not permit me to include 
any other case studies, but they are a powerful opportunity for further research. Further down the 
line, this work could expand beyond industrial health crises to look at other potential classes of 
focusing event, like investigative journalism, international events, viral social media content, or 
even political elections themselves.  
As of now, there is little question that problems like Exide and Aliso will continue to 
exist. Despite the US’s increasing move to the service sector, there is a strong core of 
manufacturing, processing, and industrial work that will continue to pose environmental and 
public health risks to nearby communities. New facilities will likely be placed in low-income 
communities of color, as they have been for decades; cycles of disaster, inadequate reform, and 
disaster will continue. However, a better understanding of the factors that influence policy 
change will hopefully allow communities to capitalize on these patterns to enact deeper 
transformations and more lasting safety.  
 
 
 
 
“The reign of toxic lead ends today… After more than nine decades of ongoing lead contamination 
in the city of Vernon, neighborhoods can now start to breathe easier.”  
Acting U.S. Atty. Stephanie Yonekura, 
Quoted in the LA Times upon the closure of Exide’s Vernon facility (Barboza, 2015a) 
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